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An Escape Route from the Medellin Maze
Abstract
Many in the United States who follow international law have tracked the course of the Supreme Court's 2008
Medellin case' especially closely, both before and after the Court's issuance of the decision. The case
concerned the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (the "Vienna Convention, "Convention" or
"VCCR"), which imposes certain obligations on the authorities of a State Party when they imprison a national
of another State Party. Among these duties is the obligation to inform the foreign prisoner that the
Convention affords the prisoner the right to communicate, while in prison, with consular officials from the
prisoner's home country. Authorities indicate that various states in the US have been lax in providing this
information to incarcerated criminal defendants who are foreign nationals.
The Medellin decision, when read with other recent Supreme Court cases, creates a veritable "maze" of
obstructions for any foreign national or any foreign sovereign who wants to obtain protection in US courts
under the Vienna Convention. This article will refer to this set of obstructions as the "Medellin Maze." Any
incarcerated defendant trying to secure the benefits of the Vienna Convention, or the home country of any
such defendant, will need to analyze possible escape routes from the Medellin Maze. Sadly, and frustratingly,
each of the possible escape routes that have thus far been explored by litigants leads to an impassible
obstruction, or "Dead End," in the Maze. There is one possible course of action, however, that could well
furnish a viable escape route from the Maze. The purpose of this article is to delineate the nature and extent of
the obstructions, or Dead Ends, currently in place, and to describe this possible plan of escape from the Maze.
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AN ESCAPE ROUTE FROM THE MEDELLIN MAZE
Anthony S. Winer*
INTRODUCTION
Many in the United States who follow international law have tracked the
course of the Supreme Court's 2008 Medellin case' especially closely, both before
and after the Court's issuance of the decision. The case concerned the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (the "Vienna Convention,' "'Convention" or
"VCCR"), 2 which imposes certain obligations on the authorities of a State Party
when they imprison a national of another State Party. Among these duties is the
obligation to inform the foreign prisoner that the Convention affords the prisoner
the right to communicate, while in prison, with consular officials from the
prisoner's home country.' Authorities indicate that various states in the US have
been lax in providing this information to incarcerated criminal defendants who are
foreign nationals."
The major jurisprudential roots of the Medellin controversy can be traced to a
2004 judgment of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). 5 In that case, which
involved fifty-two Mexican nationals imprisoned in Texas, the ICJ directed the US
to take action to remedy violations of the VCCR provisions noted above.6
President George W. Bush subsequently issued a memorandum for the Attorney
Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, Saint Paul, Minnesota; A.B., University
of California, Berkeley; J.D., University of Chicago; LL.M., New York University. I would like to
thank my research assistant, Ms. Siobhan Tolar, for her valuable assistance, and my colleague, Professor
Daniel Kleinberger, for his valuable comments.
1. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
2. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261
[hereinafter VCCR].
3. See id. art. 36(1)(b) ("Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person
arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay.
The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this
subparagraph.").
4. For example, the judgment of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") in Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (discussed below) cites nine US states that have, in recent years, collectively placed
large numbers of Mexican criminal defendants on death row, allegedly without having complied with
the requirements of the Vienna Convention. The Avena case cites these as being: California (twenty-
eight cases), Texas (fifteen cases), Illinois (three cases), and Arizona, Arkansas, Nevada, Ohio,
Oklahoma and Oregon (one case each). These cases took place between 1979 and 2004. See Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 24, 15 (Mar. 31).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 72, 153(9) (declaring that "the appropriate reparation in this case consists in the
obligation of the United States of America to provide, by means of its own choosing, review and
reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals referred to" in the Court's
judgment).
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General directing the Texas courts to abide by the judgment of the ICJ.7 But three
years later, in Medellin v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that Texas courts were
not required to comply with the judgment of the ICJ, or with the President's
memorandum, when state law procedural limitations barred petitions to obtain such
compliance.8 Accordingly, the Supreme Court's decision permitted Texas to
execute Jos6 Ernesto Medellin, a convicted murderer who was a Mexican citizen,
without having afforded him the protections of the Vienna Convention prior to his
conviction."
The Medellin decision, when read with other recent Supreme Court cases,"0
creates a veritable "maze" of obstructions for any foreign national or any foreign
sovereign who wants to obtain protection in US courts under the Vienna
Convention. This article will refer to this set of obstructions as the "Medellin
Maze." Any incarcerated defendant trying to secure the benefits of the Vienna
Convention, or the home country of any such defendant, will need to analyze
possible escape routes from the Medellin Maze. Sadly, and frustratingly, each of
the possible escape routes that have thus far been explored by litigants leads to an
impassible obstruction, or "Dead End," in the Maze. There is one possible course
of action, however, that could well furnish a viable escape route from the Maze.
The purpose of this article is to delineate the nature and extent of the obstructions,
or Dead Ends, currently in place, and to describe this possible plan of escape from
the Maze.
In so doing, this article is neither praising nor criticizing the Supreme Court's
pronouncements in Medellin regarding broader jurisprudential issues. Such issues
relate chiefly to the meaning of the phrase, "self-executing treaty,"" the limitations
on presidential powers, 2 and the interpretation of the phrase "supreme Law of the
7. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to U.S. Atty. General (Feb. 28, 2005), quoted
in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 503 (2008) ("I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in
me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the United States
will discharge its international obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice in
[Avena], by having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of
comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.").
8. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 498-49 ("We conclude that neither Avena nor the President's
memorandum constitutes directly enforceable federal law that preempts state limitations on the filing of
successive habeas petitions.").
9. The ICJ noted Jose Ernesto Medellin's execution by the State of Texas on August 5, 2008 in
a later judgment regarding a request for interpretation submitted to the ICJ by Mexico. Request for
Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals, 2009 I.C.J. 139 at 4, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) 4, 6 (Req. for
Interpretation of the Judgment) (order of Jan. 19, 2009).
10. These are principally Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) and Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,
548 U.S. 331 (2006). These cases are both discussed in more detail, infra Part n.A.
11. E.g., John T. Parry, A Primer on Treaties and § 1983 After Medellin v. Texas, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 35, 61-63 (2009) (describing his view of the significance of self-executing status and its
relationship with the availability of judicial enforcement of treaty rights by individuals); William M.
Carter, Jr., Treaties as Law and the Rule of Laws: The Judicial Power to Compel Domestic Treaty
Implementation, 69 MD. L. REv. 344, 347 (2010) (asserting that "non-self-executing treaties are federal
law under the Supremacy Clause," notwithstanding their self-executing status).
12. E.g., Ronald A. Brand, Treaties and the Separation of Powers in the US.: A Reassessment
After Medellin v. Texas 18-20 (U.Pitt. Sch. of L. Research, Working Paper No. 2008-33, 2008)
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Land" in Article VI, Clause 2 of the US Constitution. 3 This article is not avoiding
comment on the Supreme Court's treatment of these issues because the issues are
unimportant; on the contrary, these issues are very important. In spite of their
importance, however, incarcerated foreign defendants and their home countries
must now accept the Court's interpretation of these broad jurisprudential issues as
current doctrine. This article, in addressing the needs of such defendants and
countries, must do so as well. This article will take these issues into account from
the perspective of counsel for an incarcerated foreign defendant or such a
defendant's country. That is, this article will present the Court's pronouncements
on these issues as features of a maze through which a course must be safely
charted. This maze must be negotiated in order to secure rights under the Vienna
Convention for criminal defendants and their home countries.
This article takes the view that the parties best suited to secure the protection
of foreign incarcerated defendants under the Vienna Convention are not the
defendants themselves, but rather their home countries. It is widely believed that
the Vienna Convention, unlike the United Nations ("UN") documents at issue in
the Medellin decision, is self-executing. 4 It is thus broadly viewed as enforceable
in US courts. Nevertheless, due to the intricacies of the doctrine of self-execution,
sovereign states are better placed than the individual prisoners themselves to secure
the protections that the Vienna Convention provides to prisoners. 5 Furthermore,
even sovereign states will not be able to obtain the Vienna Convention's
protections for the most unfortunate prisoners-those whose initial criminal
prosecutions have already run their full course and who have exhausted all linear
appeals. However, in each jurisdiction where such a foreign defendant has been
denied the protections of the Vienna Convention, this article provides the home
country of such defendant with a means of assuring that no further denials of that
sort take place.
This article posits the use of an "Article 36 Injunction," named for the
provision of the Vienna Convention that requires the consular notice at issue in
Medellin. This article will explain how and why a prisoner's home state can obtain
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-1319818 (investigating the "weight" that courts should put on
presidential determinations regarding the self-executing status of treaties); David J. Bederman, Agora:
Medellin: Medellin 's New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (2008).
13. E.g., Carlos Manuel Vhizquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARv. L. REv. 599, 602 (2008) (asserting that the Supremacy
Clause creates a presumption that treaties are self-executing, which can be overcome by a clear
statement to the contrary); Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality 9 (Duke L. Sch. Publ.
L. & Theory, Paper No. 239, 2009) available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1340651 ("The Supremacy
clause does not by itself tell us the extent to which treaties should be judicially enforceable.").
14. Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 828 (1 1th Cir. 2008) ("The Vienna Convention is self-
executing because it has the force of domestic law without Congress having to implement legislation.");
Comjeo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2007) ("There is no question that the
Vienna Convention is self-executing."); Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 2007) ("[I]t is
undisputed that the Convention [VCCR] is self-executing, meaning that legislative action was not
necessary before it could be enforced."); Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 378 (7th Cir. 2005)("We . ..
conclude that the Vienna Convention is a self-executing treaty."), withdrawn, 480 F.3d 822, 824 (7th
Cir. 2007).
15. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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a federal injunction against the authorities of any US jurisdiction that has denied
Article 36 protections, thus prohibiting further denial of protections under the
Convention.16  Such an injunction will avoid the restrictions of the Eleventh
Amendment, and can thus have the broad, indefinite, and prospective effect of
guaranteeing future compliance with the Vienna Convention in each enjoined
jurisdiction.
A disadvantage of this approach is that it does not apply to current prisoners
(including those on death row) who, having experienced their full trials and all
linear appeals, have failed to raise the Vienna Convention issue. 7 Prospective
application, which is necessary to avoid the effects of the Eleventh Amendment,
precludes the availability of the proffered injunction for these prisoners. The major
focus of this article, however, is the continuing availability of international law,
namely, the Vienna Convention protections under Article 36. The approach
advanced in this article should be sufficiently useful in a broad variety of
prospective cases, such that its inability to assist in these especially unfortunate
cases should not detract from the significance of the approach.
In order to fully appreciate the basis of the Article 36 Injunction proposed in
this article, it is necessary to be familiar with the Vienna Convention as a whole.
Accordingly, Part I of this article begins with a description of the text and purposes
of the Vienna Convention as an entire document. After an overview of the whole
treaty, more particular attention is given to Article 36 and its relationship to the
treaty in general.
Next, Part II of this article details the structure of the Medellin Maze. It will
consider, in turn, each possible strategy that has been attempted by a foreign
prisoner or home country to secure Article 36 protections, and each strategy that
could be attempted in light of judicial and academic discussions up to this point.
But even though there have been and could be many such strategies, the impact of
the Medellin case, as well as other lines of federal case law, have erected
substantial barriers to each of them. It will, thus, be shown that each of these
strategies leads to a Dead End in the Medellin Maze.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
17. The fact that many of the foreign prisoners in US detention whose VCCR rights have been
denied were also death row inmates has been a significant element of the passion that has attached to
these cases. See, e.g., Margaret E. McGuinness, Three Narratives of Medellin v. Texas, 31 SUFFOLK J.
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 227, 230, 243 (2008) (describing the Supreme Court's 2008 Medellin decision as
"a rallying point for anti-death penalty activists around the world," and describing the use of VCCR
noncompliance as a "norm portal" through which the death penalty can be attacked); Valerie Epps, The
Medellin v. Texas Symposium: A Case Worthy of Comment, 31 SUFFOLK J. TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 209,
210 (2008) (remarking that "the happenstance of these cases [of VCCR violation] occurring in
circumstances where the death penalty had been ordered has brought them a type of universal fame that
certainly would not have adhered to regular treaty violation cases."); Christina M. Cerna, The Right to
Consular Notification as a Human Right, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 419, 438 (2008) (referring
to a "frontal attack launched by Europe and Latin America against the continued imposition of the death
penalty by the United States."). See generally William Schabas, International Law, the United States of
America and Capital Punishment, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 377 (2008) (describing the ways in
which the death penalty affects the ICJ rulings on the US violation of the VCCR).
[Vol. 25:331i
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Some of these barriers have been clearly established by the Supreme Court or
other federal courts in Medellin and other cases. These Dead Ends are
impregnable. Other possible Dead Ends have not yet been definitively created as
such by the Supreme Court, and strategies to circumvent them may technically
remain available for prisoners, home countries, and others mindful of their
interests. With respect to these potential strategies, this article takes the position
that there are substantial, well-developed areas of federal constitutional law that are
also likely to result in the erection of Dead Ends. This article does not denominate
these strategies as Dead Ends out of a conviction that they are legally invalid.
Rather, this article calls these strategies Dead Ends based on a strong suspicion that
the federal courts (and the Supreme Court in particular) will erect doctrinal barriers
against them in the future. This would be the case even if what academics would
consider the "best" view of the relevant doctrines would not, in fact, result in a
Dead End.
This article then returns to the Vienna Convention in Part I1. This time, the
review focuses on the precise provisions and formulations from the Vienna
Convention's text that lay the groundwork for the Article 36 Injunction. Finally,
Part IV advocates use of the Injunction, and demonstrates why its issuance would
be consistent with the Eleventh Amendment.
I. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS
The VCCR 8 is one of the foundational documents of modem international
relations. It is the framework convention that provides the legal medium through
which consuls and consulates exercise their functions on a daily basis throughout
the world.'9 It does this principally by prescribing a broadly stated and somewhat
lengthy set of consular functions" and an extensive list of consular privileges and
immunities.2' The Convention includes intricate systems for facilitating these
functions and protecting these privileges and immunities, described more fully
18. VCCR, supra note 2.
19. E.g., CHARLES W. FREEMAN, JR., THE DIPLOMAT'S DICTIONARY 305 (U.S. Institute of Peace
Press 1997) (1994) ("Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A convention, dated 1963, that
codified international practice with regard to consular privileges and immunities."). In addition, one of
the most widely available reference works on practical diplomacy bases its section entitled "Consular
Officers and Consular Posts" almost exclusively on the text of the Convention. In the ten-page chapter,
there are repeated explicit references to the Convention, and the discussion reflects the Convention's
provisions with almost slavish fidelity. See RALPH G. FELTHAM, DIPLOMATIC HANDBOOK 45-54 (8th
ed. 2004); see also R.P. BARSTON, MODERN DIPLOMACY 341 (3d ed. 2006) (citing the Convention as
"the relevant international agreement [ ] concerning the operation and functioning" of consulates).
20. Article 5 of the Convention is entitled "Consular Functions," and contains thirteen sub-
paragraphs delimiting such functions, usually in broad language. For example, sub-paragraph (a) lists as
such a consular function, "protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and its
nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, within the limits permitted by international law.").
VCCR, supra note 2, art. 5.
21. Chapter II of the Convention (Articles 28-57) lists and protects consular facilities, privileges
and immunities. Id. ch. I1, sec. I. These are further broken down into "Facilities, Privileges and
Immunities Relating to the Consular Post," id. ch. II, sec. I, and "Facilities, Privileges and Immunities
Relating to Career Consular Officers and Other Members of a Consular Post." Id. ch. H, sec. II.
2010]
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INTL LAW
below." In so doing, the Convention refers to any state that establishes a consular
post in another state as a "sending State," and refers to any state in which a
consular post is established by another state as a "receiving State. '23 Ambassadors
and embassies represent the political interests of their sending States in receiving
States, whereas consuls and consulates generally represent the interests of their
domestic nationals when those nationals are present in receiving States. 4
In order to understand the intricacies of the Medellin Maze, it is first necessary
to secure a somewhat intimate familiarity with the Convention and, in particular,
Article 36. The next section will briefly review the Convention's general
characteristics, some of the circumstances of its preparation, the precise text of
Article 36, and the significance of that text for many of those most closely involved
with its application.
A. The General Features and Functions of the Convention
The VCCR consists of seventy-five articles grouped into five chapters; in its
original UN manuscript in double-spaced form, it is forty-five pages long.25 Most
of its provisions deal with the establishment and functioning of consular relations,
or with the various privileges and immunities accorded to consular personnel.
For example, the VCCR prescribes a long list of "consular functions," most
prominently including protecting the interests of nationals of the sending State in
the receiving State, 26 furthering commercial and cultural relations between the
sending State and the receiving State,27 and issuing passports, visas and other transit
documents to persons located in the receiving State. 2  The Convention also
describes the procedures for, and consequences of, a declaration by a receiving
State that a consular officer from a sending State is persona non grata.29 Among its
many other provisions detailing the mechanics of consular relations, the
Convention assures freedom of movement and freedom of communication for
consular officials," and provides for the inviolability of consular premises, archives
and documents." Among the privileges and immunities provided for in the
22. See infra Parts II.A. I and lII.A.2.
23. E.g., VCCR, supra note 2, art. 4(2) ('The seat of the consular post, its classification and the
consular district shall be established by the sending State and shall be subject to the approval of the
receiving State.").
24. See, e.g., Charles W. Freeman, supra note 19, at 54 ("A consul is an official agent sent by a
state to reside in a foreign territory to assist and see to the protection of its nationals there."); id. at 55
("Consulates are headed by consuls."); id. at 13 (defining an "Ambassador" as "[a] diplomatic agent of
the highest rank, accredited to a foreign sovereign ... as the resident representative of his own
government ..."); id. at 98 (defining an "Embassy" as "[t]he residence of an ambassador.").
25. The original manuscript form of the Convention can be found through consulting "Chapter
III" of the "Status of Treaties" page at the website of the UN Treaty Collection. See United Nations
Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org.
26. VCCR, supra note 2, art. 5(a).
27. Id. art. 5(b).
28. Id. art. 5(d).
29. Id. art. 23.
30. Id. arts. 34-35.
31. Id. arts. 31,33.
[Vol. 25:331
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Convention are a qualified immunity from arrest and detention for consular officers
and employees.3 2 The Convention also generally protects consular officers and
employees from the jurisdiction of the judicial and administrative authorities of the
receiving State.33 Consular officers and employees are also generally exempt under
the Convention from requirements for residence permits, work permits, and social
security compliance.' Consular premises and consular officers and employees are
generally exempt from most taxes levied by the receiving State."
B. The International Law Commission as the Convention's Author
The VCCR was drafted under the auspices of the International Law
Commission ("ILC") and ultimately signed in 1963.36 The UN General Assembly
created the ILC in 1948, 37 pursuant to the UN Charter's mandate to encourage "the
progressive development of international law and its codification."" Accordingly,
a significant portion of the ILC's work has consisted of preparing, for signature and
ratification, draft multilateral treaties that codify previously existing international
law from customary sources or more narrowly-based earlier treaties.
In the early years of the UN, the ILC turned its attention to codifying some of
the most basic structures of international law, structures that had previously been
chiefly within the realm of customary law. Among the ILC's earliest projects were
the broadly-subscribed Treaty on the Continental Shelf,39 signed in 1958, and
related maritime treaties. '
With the arrival of the 1960s, the ILC was preparing a set of draft treaties
directed at diplomatic relations and other aspects of the relationships between
states. The most prominent of these was probably the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations ("VCDR"), 1 signed in 1961. It was, and remains, the basic
framework document setting forth the legal rules under which the activities of
ambassadors, embassies and their staff are conducted. The VCCR followed, and
then in 1969, another signal ILC achievement, the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties,42 was signed. The foundational character of all of these treaties was an
32. Id. art. 42.
33. Id. art. 43.
34. Id. arts. 46-48.
35. Id. arts. 49-50.
36. The history of the International Law Commission's ("ILCs") work through the various
drafting stages of the VCCR is described at the ILC's website. See International Law Commission,
http://www.un.org/law/ilc (the drafting history is found at the "Texts, instruments and final reports"
page of the website).
37. G.A. Res. 174(1) (Nov. 21, 1947) (establishing the ILC and approving its Statute).
38. U.N. Charter, art. 13, (1)(a).
39. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 28, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471,499 U.N.T.S. 311.
40. E.g., Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
41. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, No. 7310, 500
U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter VCDR].
42. Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
2010]
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important stabilizing influence in view of the anxiety surrounding the height of the
Cold War.
It is worthwhile to keep in mind the provenance of the VCCR within the ILC
for at least two reasons. First, the fact that it was the ILC that developed the
VCCR, and the fact that it did so early in the life of the ILC, emphasize the central
and foundational character of the VCCR subject matter to modem international
law. On the other hand, the VCCR's origin within the ILC also can be viewed as
having a limiting effect on certain interpretational questions involving the VCCR.
The work of the ILC has been almost exclusively focused on what might be called
operational issues of international law among states. The ILC has done very little
work regarding the development of international human righwwts law. 3 Many of
the most foundational human rights documents have been developed through the
General Assembly or specialized UN commissions, rather than the ILC." Although
this observation is not conclusive on any particular point, it is relevant to the
issue-later addressed in this article 4'--of whether the notice requirements of the
VCCR set forth fundamental human rights that can be enforced individually by the
prisoners involved."1
C. Article 36 of the Convention and Its Broadest Applications
As previously noted, Article 36 of the VCCR contains the prisoner notification
requirement central to the Medellin line of cases. Due to the impact of the Medellin
litigation and its precursors, it is Article 36 that has attracted the most attention in
recent years. 4  This identification of Article 36 with the fact pattern of cases like
Medellin involving prisoners accused of serious violent crimes, often sitting on
43. The "Texts, instruments and final reports" page of the ILC website, supra note 36, lists the
drafts, treaties and other documents prepared over the years by the ILC, arranged according to subject
matter. In this list, there is no subject heading for "Human Rights," for example. The closest subject
heading would be "Position of the individual in international law," and the only finished materials listed
under that subject heading involve the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961).
44. For example, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was initially proclaimed by the UN
General Assembly, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") were initially developed
by the UN Commission on Human Rights. E.g., FRANK NEWMAN & DAvID WEISSBRODT,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (1990).
45. See infra Part II.C.
46. Some commentators have expressed skepticism as to whether these are indeed fundamental
human rights. See Cema, supra note 17, at 432 (noting the significance in this respect of the VCCR's
failure to "require the [imprisoned] national's state to provide assistance to its national once it is
informed of his/her detention in the host state."), at 433 (characterizing the posture of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in this respect as "aggressive"), at 437 (noting again that the Inter-
American Court did not "posit an obligation on the part of an alien's State of nationality to provide any
assistance to the alien once it is contacted," and inquiring whether there could be a "human right"
without "a corresponding State obligation"), at 453 (expressing the view that the ICJ "demurred" on the
question in its Avena judgment) cited in note 5, supra.
47. For example, two of the most recent symposia devoted to the Medellin case and its ancillary
issues appeared in the American Journal of International Law and the Suffolk Transnational Law
Journal. Symposium Agora: Medellin, 102 Am. J. INT'L L. 529 (2008); The Medellin v. Texas
Symposium: A Case Worthy of Comment, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 209 (2008).
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death row, has increased the urgency of the issues involved. However, it has also
obscured the broader picture of the VCCR, and (to a degree) even Article 36 itself.
Although Article 36 certainly applies to prisoners held in detention by foreign
states, it also has broader applicability. Article 36 requirements are part of an
extensive scheme of consular relations, integral to the conduct of modem
international affairs. Some of the protections of Article 36 apply to all persons
finding themselves in foreign jurisdictions, not just prisoners. Within paragraph 1
of Article 36, only the last two subparagraphs, (b) and (c), apply to prisoners. The
first, subparagraph 1 (a), protects all nationals of a State Party who find themselves
within the jurisdiction of another State Party, in whatever context.
The full text of Article 36 is as follows:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to
nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the
sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State
shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and
access to consular officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall,
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its
consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison
or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any
communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in
prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities
without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending
State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond
with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have
the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison,
custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment.
Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking an action on
behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly
opposes such action.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised
in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject
to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full
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effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
Article are intended.
4 8
The chief concern underlying Article 36 is the preservation of free
communication within any receiving State between the consular post of any
sending State and the sending State's nationals in the receiving State. This concern
is most broadly expressed in subparagraph 1(a), which describes two correlative
"rights" that the officials of any receiving State are required to observe. First, the
consular officials of any sending State have the right to communicate with and
have access to nationals of the sending State who find themselves within the
receiving State. Second, and correlatively, sending State nationals have the right to
communicate with and have access to consular officials of the sending State within
any receiving State.'9
To anyone who has traveled in a foreign country, and who has been even
minimally conscious of his or her circumstances while outside of their home
country, the importance of subparagraph l(a) should be self-evident." The
potential need for consular aid can arise for any traveler abroad, at virtually any
time, for any number of reasons. For example, (i) a business person from the
sending State may need assistance if licensing authorities from the receiving State
are behaving in ways that are illegal and grossly unjust," (ii) a visiting sending
State national who becomes physically incapacitated in the receiving State may
need assistance in returning to the sending State,52 and (iii) visitors from the
sending State may need assistance in dealing with last-minute changes to visa
requirements imposed by the receiving State as they leave the receiving State.53
48. VCCR, supra note 2, art. 36.
49. In both such cases, there is no specification or delimitation of any particular varieties of
sending State nationals for whom it might be especially important to assure these communications and
this access. This kind of protection is considered under subparagraph (a) to be important regarding all
nationals of a given sending State within any receiving State, without any differentiation as to their
circumstances. Id. art. 36(a).
50. When any person leaves his or her own home country, any protections afforded to that
person by the constitution or laws of the home country are generally not opposable against officials of
foreign states. Nationals of any state present in a state other than their own are, in general terms,
completely subject to the jurisdiction of the officials of the foreign state. Differences in language, legal
traditions and cultural norms can result in difficulties for anyone traveling outside his or her own home
country. When these difficulties arise, the aid of an official representative from one's own home
country, located in the foreign country where the problem has arisen, can prove indispensable.
51. Article 5, subparagraphs (b) and (c) of the VCCR list among consular functions "furthering
the development of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations" and "ascertaining by all
lawful means conditions and developments in the commercial, economic, cultural and scientific life of
the receiving State," respectively. VCCR, supra note 2, art. 5(b)-(c).
52. Article 5, subparagraph (h) of the VCCR lists among consular functions the "safeguarding
[of] the interests of minors and other persons lacking full capacity who are nationals of the sending
State." Id. art. 5(h).
53. Article 5, subparagraphs (d) and (e) of the VCCR list among consular functions "issuing
passports and travel documents to nationals of the sending State" and "helping and assisting nationals..
. of the sending State," respectively. Id. art. 5(d)-(e).
[Vol. 25:331
AN ESCAPE ROUTE FROM THE MEDELLiN MAZE
Subparagraph 1(a) helps preserve the ability of consular officials and sending
State nationals to contact each other through safeguarding their mutual ability to
communicate with and have access to one another. Clearly, if a receiving State
does not even permit consular officials and sending State nationals to communicate
with and have access to one another, in contravention of subparagraph l(a), the
broader goals of the entire VCCR framework vis-A-vis that receiving State could be
substantially impaired. In that event, the interests of the sending State's nationals
in the receiving State would certainly suffer. However, it is important to realize
that the interests of the sending State itself, as a sovereign entity, would also suffer.
The residents of the sending State would see their government as being unable to
protect them abroad, hence decreasing the legitimacy of the government and, in
some cases, the state itself. The sending State also would be seen in the
international community as unable to protect its nationals, thus decreasing its
stature and potentially its trustworthiness in international relations. The ability of
the sending State to conduct international relations could also be put into doubt, to
the extent that its consular staff was shown to be undependable and ineffectual.
For all these and many other reasons, a violation of subparagraph l(a) could injure
a sending State as much as, if not more than, its nationals.
D. Article 36 of the Convention and Its Impact on Prisoners
While subparagraph l(a) has broad application to all sending State nationals
located in receiving States, subparagraphs l(b) and l(c) are aimed specifically at
sending State nationals who are arrested, imprisoned, in custody, or otherwise
detained by the authorities of a receiving State. Nevertheless, in spite of their more
specific application, these subparagraphs also raise precisely the same dignitary
concerns for the sending State, as a sovereign entity, as are raised by subparagraph
l(a). If a receiving State denies the protections of subparagraphs l(b) or 1(c), the
interests of the sending State are impaired in the same ways as when subparagraph
1 (a) is being violated. It is largely for this reason, no doubt, that the fact situations
contemplated in these two subparagraphs appear in Article 36, immediately
following subparagraph 1(a).
Subparagraph l(b) sets forth two correlative sets of "rights" in these
circumstances. On the one hand, the incarcerated sending State national has three
rights as against the receiving State authorities. These are: (i) a right to require
receiving State officials to inform the consular officials of the sending State of his
or her arrest, imprisonment, custody or detention; (ii) the right to have the receiving
State authorities forward any communications to the sending State consular post
without delay; and (iii) the right to be informed by receiving State authorities,
without delay, of the first two of these rights. On the other hand, the consular post
has a correlative right, as constituted against the receiving State authorities. This is
to receive without delay notification of the arrest, imprisonment, custody or other
detention of any sending State national who has decided to exercise the first of the
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above-described rights ascribed to him or her, and to have consular officials so
notified.
Within the context of arrest, imprisonment, custody or detention, subparagraph
l(c) is a bit more general. It provides that consular officials generally have the
right to visit a sending State national who is in prison or custody, to converse and
correspond with any such national, and also to arrange for the legal representation
of any such national. 4 Just as the general protections afforded by subparagraph
l(a) are obviously important to any and all foreign travelers, the protections of
subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) are extremely important to those persons in a foreign
country who find themselves incarcerated." The importance of this interest is all
the more compelling when one remembers that incarceration in a foreign country
may not be the result of a wrongful act. Differences in language, legal traditions
and cultural norms can cause misunderstandings that result in incarceration of
various kinds, even when the incarcerated person is completely (or largely)
blameless. Add to this those circumstances in which foreign authorities, or their
nationals, may harbor a certain amount of ill will toward those from other states (or
a particular other state), and one readily sees that this type of consular assistance is
of paramount importance to anyone incarcerated in a foreign country. It should be
clear that subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article 36 help assure the availability of
this assistance in these circumstances.
In this connection, it is worthwhile to address an aspect of the Medellin case
emphasized by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court majority goes a certain
distance out of its way to describe in grisly detail the violent crime of which
Medellin was convicted.16 Such a recounting is, of course, not strictly necessary for
54. They only have this right, however, if the sending State national who is arrested, imprisoned,
in custody or detained does not expressly oppose such actions on their part. Id. art. 36(I)(c).
55. Being incarcerated in a foreign country, again with differences in language, customs and
legal systems, is a distressing situation to say the least. One may be legitimately suspected of a serious
crime in the foreign country, and the incarceration may in fact be objectively justifiable. But that does
not reduce the importance of access to (and communication with) officials of one's home consulate.
Even if one has in fact committed a serious crime, the general world consensus is that one should have
fully adequate legal representation. And for foreign nationals incarcerated by states other than their
own, fully adequate representation is very likely to include the involvement of one's home consulate.
56. In Part I.B of its opinion, the Court provides the following details:
Petitioner Jose Eresto Medellin, a Mexican national, has lived in the United States since
preschool. A member of the 'Black and Whites' gang, Medellin was convicted of capital
murder and sentenced to death in Texas for the gang rape and brutal murders of two Houston
teenagers.
On June 24, 1993, 14-year-old Jennifer Ertman and 16-year-old Elizabeth Pena were
walking home when they encountered Medellin and several fellow gang members. Medellin
attempted to engage Elizabeth in conversation. When she tried to run, petitioner threw her to
the ground. Jennifer was grabbed by other gang members when she, in response to her
friend's cries, ran back to help. The gang members raped both girls for over an hour. Then,
to prevent their victims from identifying them, Medellin and his fellow gang members
murdered the girls and discarded their bodies in a wooded area. Medellin was personally
responsible for strangling at least one of the girls with her own shoelace.
Medellin was arrested at approximately 4 a.m. on June 29, 1993. A few hours later,
between 5:54 and 7:23 a.m., Medellin was given Miranda warnings; he then signed a written
waiver and gave a detailed written confession.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 501-02 (2008).
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any of the legal points the majority makes in its opinion. However, the rhetorical
function of the graphic description is obvious. The Court majority is attaching
implicit importance to the fact that Medellin committed a heinously violent and
vicious act; they are indicating that there is no question that he is guilty. Those
who argue his cause in the name of international law, the Court's rhetoric implies,
are doing so in the unmerited service of a ghastly man who has committed a
ghastly crime.
It is worth pointing out that when US nationals find themselves incarcerated
abroad, they might themselves be accused and convicted of crimes that, according
to local mores, may be horrific indeed." Sometimes crimes might seem
comparatively less atrocious to US nationals than they do to the nationals of other
countries. A principal reason that activists and commentators care so much about
the treatment of Medellin is that his poor treatment by the US could provide a
reciprocal license to foreign governments to similarly mistreat US detainees within
their own borders. That is, the more casually the US treats VCCR protections of
detained foreign nationals, the less confident US citizens and officials can be that
the Convention's protections will be afforded to them abroad.
It is not a sufficient answer to say that the US may only be casual about VCCR
protections for the most ghastly criminals because comparatively less harmful acts
(in the eyes of Americans) may be considered to be similarly ghastly when
committed by US nationals in other countries. This is all the more true when a US
national has not committed what US law considers a crime, or is being held on
potentially trumped-up charges created to mask a political imprisonment.
Governments holding foreign prisoners for political reasons may be more likely to
charge them, as an official matter, with crimes that are especially heinous."5 It
makes no difference that the charges are transparently false. The mere fact that US
states can deny VCCR protections with impunity in the case of particularly heinous
crimes provides all the "cover" that is necessary for nefarious governments to do
the same to US nationals, whether or not there are any bases to the charges.
57. See, e.g., McGuinness, supra note 17, at 244-45 ("Consular protection can mean the
difference between fair process, some process, and no process. In places with less developed rule of law
traditions, where international human rights regimes have largely failed to make a difference in
individual cases, political intervention on behalf of co-nationals can be a more effective means of
protecting individual rights. Indeed, this fact is the premise on which the VCCR notification is based.").
58. An example here would be Libya's treatment of the Palestinian and Bulgarian medical
professionals accused of intentionally transmitting HIV to Libyan infants, when in all likelihood the
infections took place in the context of inadequate sanitation in Libyan facilities. Rather than admit that
his own government was inadequately protective of its own citizens, Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi
charged the foreigners with a heinous crime for political reasons. There is no good reason to suppose
that the tendency to imprison foreigners for political reasons would be any less marked when the
foreigners are US nationals than when they are Palestinians or Bulgarians. If anything, their desirability
as political foils may often be greater. See, e.g., Libya-Jailed Bulgarian Nurses, Palestinian Plead
Innocent, NOVINITE, Feb. 27,2007, http://www.novinite.com/view news.php?id=77142.
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E. Individual Enforceability Under Article 36
The text of Article 36 refers to the "right" of sending State nationals to
protection under its terms. And, indeed, the discussion up to this point has, on
occasion, referenced a foreign prisoner's "right" or "rights" under the VCCR.
However, use of the word "right" in this connection is arguably problematic. The
frequency with which this linguistic usage has arisen in the discussion so far, and
with which it will arise going forward, makes necessary a brief discussion of the
interpretative problems it raises.
In the context of international treaties, "rights" of nationals of the contracting
states are often referenced when the nationals do not themselves have such
"rights," as that term might be used in the context of domestic law. Some lower
federal courts have used the example of a fishing treaty between the US and other
states, 9 which may refer to "rights" of the individuals in each country's fishing
industry to fish in the waters of the other. Such a treaty might use the word "right,"
but it would not ordinarily connote the ability of the individuals in the industry to
sue the foreign state if it behaved contrary to the treaty. In the event of a violation
by one state or the other, the members of the fishing industry in the wronged state
would normally complain to their domestic authorities, who would then address the
authorities of the offending state for violating the "rights" of the members of its
fishing industry.'
Other examples are presented in various human rights conventions, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")6  and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"),62
which detail specified "rights" of individuals under them, but do not require that
each State Party to the convention stand ready to enforce those rights under the
State Party's standard domestic judicial procedures. These conventions themselves
create committees that monitor compliance and attempt to address enforcement in
that way.63 It is not a necessary feature of either convention that any State Party
59. E.g., U.S. v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 195 n. 3 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Even where a treaty
provides certain benefits for nationals of a particular state-such as fishing rights-it is traditionally
held that ... individual rights are only derivative through the States.") (quoting U.S. v. Gengler, 510
F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1975)).
60. Id.
61. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
62. International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
63. Under the ICCPR, States Parties submit reports on adopted measures fulfilling their duties
giving effect to the Covenant. ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 40(1). States Parties submit the reports to the
UN Secretary-General (Id. art. 40(2)), who transmits them to the Human Rights Committee established
pursuant to ICCPR Article 28. A State Party may, under specified circumstances, report to the
Committee the failure of another State Party to fulfill their obligations under the ICCPR. Id. art. 41(1).
In general, the Committee will ascertain that all available domestic remedies have been exhausted
before it will deal with any asserted failure of compliance. Id. art. 41(l)(c). The Committee holds
closed meetings when examining communications regarding such matters. Id. art. 41(1)(d). The
Committee is generally required to issue a report to the States Parties concerned within twelve months.
Id. art. 41(h).
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afford domestic relief through domestic judicial action. And yet both conventions
make liberal use of the word "right."'
There is a substantial question in the context of Article 36 as to whether the
rights it mentions must be directly enforceable by individuals in domestic courts.
While this question will be addressed in more detail in Part II.C of this article, at
this point, various observations are in order. The substantial majority of US circuit
courts of appeal that have addressed this question have answered it in the
negative. 6  On the other hand, the ICJ and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights have answered the question in the affirmative." Similarly, there is no
shortage of academic commentary arguing that Article 36 rights must be
Under the ICESCR, State Parties submit reports on the measures they have adopted and progress
they have made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized in the Covenant. ICESCR, supra
note 62, art.16(l). States Parties submit these reports to the UN Secretary-General who transmits them
to the Economic and Social Council. Id. art. 16(2)(a). The Economic and Security Council may bring
to the attention of other UN organs and agencies any matters arising out of such reports that may assist
such other bodies in deciding on international measures likely to contribute to the progressive
implementation of the Covenant. Id art. 22. States Parties agree to certain international actions for the
achievement of the rights recognized in the Covenant Id. art. 23.
Under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR ("Optional Protocol to ICESCR"), the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the UN Economic and Social Council (the "Committee")
assumes certain duties under the ICESCR. For example, under the Protocol, communications may be
submitted to the Committee by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals under the jurisdiction
of a State Party, claiming to be victims of a violation of the ICESCR. See Optional Protocol to the
ICESCR, art. 2, G.A. Res. 63/117 U.N. Doc. A/Res/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008). Communications will not
be admissible unless all available domestic remedies have been exhausted. Id. art. 3(1). The Committee
may recommend necessary interim measures to avoid possible irreparable damage to victims. Id art. 5.
The Optional Protocol also outlines procedures for the friendly settlement of matters arising under the
ICESCR and the Optional Protocol. Id. art. 7. The Optional Protocol also provides the Committee with
authority similar to that of the ICCPR Human Rights Committee with respect to reported violations of
the ICESCR. Id arts. 10-13.
64. It may well be that courts in some (or many) countries refer to, or even enforce, certain
provisions of these or other similar treaties. They may also be enforced by certain multilateral tribunals.
The point being made, however, is that neither the ICCPR nor the ICESCR requires that their provisions
be judicially enforceable by individuals in domestic courts.
65. See, e.g, Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 828 (11th Cir. 2008) ("The [VCCR] Treaty
simply fails to confer individual rights that may be judicially enforced."); Cornjeo v. County of San
Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 863 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Accordingly, we hold that Article 36 does not
unambiguously give Cornejo a privately enforceable right."); Medellin v. Texas Dept. of Crim. Justice,
371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004) ("We are bound to apply this holding, [that Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention does not create an individually enforceable right]."); US. v. Jimenez Nava, 243 F.3d 192,
198 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The sum of Jimenez-Nava's arguments fails to lead to an ineluctable conclusion
that Article 36 creates judicially enforceable rights of consultation between a detained foreign national
and his consular office."). Contrast: Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 835 (7th Cir. 2007) ("Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention by its terms grants private rights to an identifiable class of persons ... from
countries... parties to the Convention who are in the United States."); Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 382
(7th Cir. 2005), withdrawn, 480 F.3d 822, 834 (7th Cir. 2007) ("Article 36 confers individual rights on
detained nationals.").
66. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.) 2001 I.C.J. 466, 494, 77 (June 27) ("[The Court concludes that
Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights."); Avena, supra note 4, at 36, 40 (referencing this
statement in LaGrand); Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of Guarantees
of Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion, (Inter-Am. Ct. of H. R. OC-16/99), 50, 84 (Oct. 1, 1999)
(concluding that Article 36 of the VCCR "endows a detained foreign national with individual rights that
are the counterpart to the host State's correlative duties.").
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individually enforceable. 7 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has repeatedly, and
explicitly, left the question undecided. 8
The question is arguable from both sides, but it is most likely that the federal
courts, having taken note of the ongoing construction of the Medellin Maze, will
not let this possibility grow into a useful escape route. This is primarily because
the arguments against individual enforcement of rights under Article 36 are
substantial. Furthermore, federal district courts and circuit courts of appeal have
witnessed the way in which the Supreme Court has treated Article 36 over the last
eleven years. The only circuit court to find in favor of judicially enforceable
individual rights under Article 36 is the Seventh Circuit. 9 The Seventh Circuit did
so in two successive hearings of the same case, the first of which occurred before
the last two Supreme Court rulings in this area. As shown later in this article, 0
most federal courts are not apt to interpret the highly debatable individual
enforceability of Article 36 in a way that is helpful to the types of defendants that
have been raising the issue. However, the question of judicial enforcement by
individuals is only one issue forming one part of the Medellin Maze. Accordingly,
this article now turns to examine each component of this Maze.
II. A GUIDED TOUR THROUGH THE MEDELLIN MAZE
As indicated above, Jose Ernesto Medellin was a Mexican citizen living in the
US who was convicted of a capital crime in Texas.7' When his case was included
in the international arguments before the ICJ, fifty-one other non-US citizens were
67. Jordan J. Paust, Medellin, Avena, The Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant Executive
Authority, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 301, 306 n.16 (2008) ("1 agree with the ICJ, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, and others that individuals have rights under the Convention.");
Cerna, supra note 17, at 419 (quoting Joan Fitzpatrick, the Unreality ofInternational Law in the United
States and the LaGrand Case, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 427, 427-33, to indicate Fitzpatrick's view that
"consular access is an individual right").
68. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (asserting that the VCCR "arguably confers on
an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest"); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S.
343, 343 (2006) (declaring it "unnecessary to resolve the question whether the Vienna Convention
grants individuals enforceable rights," and that "we assume, without deciding, that Article 36 does grant
... such rights"); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (showing that the Court "assumes
without deciding" that "Article 36 grants foreign nationals 'an individually enforceable right to request
that their consular officers be notified of their detention').
69. In that case, an Indian national brought an action against law enforcement officials alleging
violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The court held that the Vienna
Convention was self-executing and conferred individually enforceable rights. See Jogi v. Voges, 480
F.3d 822, 822 (7th Cir. 2007). This was after an earlier decision of the same case, to broadly the same
effect. Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 367 (7th Cir. 2005). The Seventh Circuit rendered its first opinion
prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Sanchez-Llamas, and so withdrew its first opinion before issuing
the second opinion, post-Sanchez-Llamas, nevertheless reaching the same result. 480 F.3d at 824. The
Seventh Circuit's second opinion was rendered prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Medellin..
70. See discussion infra Part II.C.
71. Sometimes, commentators are sensitive to the use of private parties' names in developing
lengthy discussions on legal doctrine. However, in view of the circumstances of this case, this is not a
material concern. This discussion will refer to the Medellin litigation, and the veritable maze that it has
constructed, through the use of the defendant's name.
[Vol. 25:331
AN ESCAPE ROUTE FROM THE MEDELLIN MAZE
also included as death row inmates that were the subjects of the litigation."
Medellin has since been executed. Most of the rest of these inmates presumably
remain on death row. In addition, it is eminently foreseeable that many other
foreign nationals will become incarcerated by state governments within the US in
the future. The issues litigated in the Supreme Court's Medellin decision will have
an impact on many of them as well. Indeed, it is these future inmates to whom the
analysis in this article is primarily directed.
A. Timing Difficulties for Many Inhabitants of the Medellin Maze
The death row inmates like Medellin who found themselves the focus of the
VCCR Article 36 issue were all convicted of violent crimes without having been
adequately informed of their rights under Article 36. In most cases, the receiving
State authorities did not notify the sending State consulates of their foreign
national's incarceration. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that both the
failures to inform and the failures to notify are violations of Article 36.1
3
Most commentators do not claim that if Medellin and the other death row
inmates in his position had been afforded timely compliance with Article 36, they
would have been found innocent of their crimes. Rather, the intimation is that, at
least in some cases, adequate assistance by consular officials might have resulted in
more effective representation in court and possibly avoidance of the death penalty.
Such a concern is, of course, highly conjectural. Even if a death sentence was not
avoided, advocates appear to believe that a procedure which provides a defendant
all the assistance to which he or she is legally entitled is preferable to one in which
the defendant is not given such protection.75 One need only recall the discussion in
72. E.g., Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, supra note 4, at 25 (listing Medellin among fifty-
two Mexican nationals initially so affected).
73. In Medellin, for example, the Supreme Court refers to the withholding of Medellin's rights
under the VCCR: "Local law enforcement officers did not . . . inform Medellin of his Vienna
Convention right to notify the Mexican consulate of his detention." Medellin, 552 U.S. at 501
(emphasis added). In a subsequent footnote, the Court also references state notification obligations
under VCCR Article 36(1)(b), and then concludes that, in light of the ultimate disposition, the Court
"need not consider whether Medellin was prejudiced in any way by the violation of his Vienna
Convention rights." Id. at 1355 n.1 (emphasis added). In Sanchez-Llamas, the Court also describes the
facts in ways that seem to acknowledge that rights under the VCCR were violated. In describing the
police arrest of the Oregon defendant in that decision, Sanchez-Llamas, the Court notes that "at no time.
. . did they inform him that he could ask to have the Mexican Consulate notified of his detention."
Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 340. And then, in describing the detention of the Virginia defendant
Bustillo, the Court notes that "[a]uthorities never informed him that he could request to have the
Honduran consulate notified of his detention." Id. at 341.
74. The Supreme Court has averted to this argument in the context of Breard, 523 U.S. at 377
("Breard's asserted prejudice-that had the Vienna Convention been followed, he would have accepted
the State's offer to forgo the death penalty in return for a plea of guilty-is far more speculative than the
claims of prejudice courts routinely reject ... ").
75. Many commentators have noted the connection between the Article 36 issue and the death
penalty. See supra, note 17. Presumably, at least some advocates for those asserting Article 36 rights
would engage in Article 36 arguments even if a death penalty were all but inevitable, and the rationale
cited in the text would seem to be among the most prominent reasons for doing so.
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the first part of this article regarding the predicament of a US traveler incarcerated
in a foreign country not known for procedural fairness to appreciate this point."6
One of the major problems that litigating inmates have had in complaining
about Article 36 violations has been timing. Unfortunately for Medellin and many
of the other inmates, the defense attorneys working on their cases did not complain
about the Article 36 violation until it was too late." In many states, "procedural
default" rules prevent a defendant from pursuing collateral relief on the basis of
arguments that were not made during trial or on direct appeal. These kinds of
procedural default rules have wreaked havoc on defendants who have been denied
their Article 36 protections. In Medellin's case, for example, he had gone through
a complete set of state trial court and state appellate court proceedings without any
of his attorneys raising the issue; the issue did not arise until state habeas corpus
proceedings were instituted on his behalf.7" The state courts then deployed the
procedural default rule to estop the further development of his Article 36 claim.9
These procedural default rules can make it almost impossible for current death row
inmates to obtain relief on the basis of Article 36.
In the course of the last eleven years, the Supreme Court has shown itself
broadly unreceptive to foreign prisoners whose Article 36 claims have been
frustrated by procedural default rules, while the ICJ has been more sympathetic.
For its part, the ICJ has issued two final judgments addressing this issue, both
finding that Article 36 precludes its frustration by domestic procedural bar rules."
The Medellin decision was in fact the third Supreme Court ruling allowing state
procedural bar rules to trump Article 36 claims.
The first of three Article 36 cases decided by the Supreme Court was Breard v.
Greene in 1998," discussed in more detail in Part II.G, below. In Breard, for a
variety of reasons, the Court determined that state procedural default rules could
effectively preclude relief resulting from Article 36 violations. One year later, the
ICJ issued its judgment in the LaGrand case,82 determining that State Parties to the
76. See supra text and notes at n.49-53.
77. In Medellin, for example, the Supreme Court noted that "Medellin first raised his Vienna
Convention claim in his first application for state post-conviction relief. The state trial court held that
the claim was procedurally defaulted because Medellin had failed to raise it at trial or on direct review."
Medellin, 552 U.S. at 501. Similarly, in Sanchez-Llamas, the Court noted an analogous delay for the
Virginia defendant in that decision, Bustillo. "After his conviction became final, Bustillo filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in state court. There, for the first time, he argued that authorities had
violated his right to consular notification under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention." Sanchez-Llamas,
548 U.S. at 341.
78. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 501 ("The State trial court held that the claim was procedurally
defaulted because Medellin had failed to raise it at trial or on direct review.").
79. Id. at 502 (indicating affirmance by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals).
80. See infra text and notes 82-90.
81. Breard, 523 U.S. at 371.
82. Germany v. United States, 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27) [hereinafter LaGrand]. The La Grand
case involved two brothers who, although born in Germany, had been moved to the US as young
children. They had returned to Germany once for six months during young adulthood, but otherwise
had remained in the US as the adopted children of a US national. The US maintained that neither was
known to have spoken German, but it was clear that they at all times retained their German nationality.
As adults, they were both tried and convicted of first degree murder in Arizona state courts, and then
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VCCR may not allow procedural default rules to preclude relief after the
Convention's terms have been violated under Article 36.83 The ICJ seemed
particularly perturbed that the inmates' delays in presenting their claims of
violation seemed largely to have been the result of the government's own failure to
inform inmates of the Article's protections." The one surviving inmate at issue in
the LaGrand case had actually been executed by state authorities more than two
years before the issuance of the ICJ judgment. The sending State authorities had
decided to pursue the ICJ proceedings until final judgment even though both
prisoners by then had been executed."5
About eighteen months after the ICJ handed down its LeGrand judgment,
Mexico commenced proceedings in the ICJ with respect to fifty-two of its nationals
on death row in various states of the US. Although nothing had occurred in the
interim to have disturbed the LaGrand judgment, Mexico was no doubt attempting
to obtain a judgment of the ICJ that would have specifically applied to its own
nationals on death row in the US.86 In 2004, the ICJ ultimately ruled in Mexico's
favor in its judgment entitled Avena and Other Mexican Nationals.7 The ICJ
reiterated its conclusion in LaGrand that Article 36 precludes its frustration
through domestic procedural default rules.8
Two years after the Avena judgment, the Supreme Court again addressed
Article 36 claims in Sanchez-Llamas v. United States.9 This case involved two
non-US nationals sentenced to lengthy prison terms in US state courts. Sanchez-
Llamas was a Mexican national, convicted in Oregon, while the second defendant,
sentenced to death. At no time prior to their conviction were their rights under the VCCR observed.
See id at 474-75, 13-15. The procedural default rule was used as a basis for denying their federal
habeas corpus petitions, which were based in part on the state's failure to observe VCCR Article 36.
See id. at 477, 23.
83. Id. at 497-98, 91 ("Under these circumstances, the procedural default rule had the effect of
preventing 'full effect [from being] given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article
are intended,' and thus violated paragraph 2 of Article 36.").
84. Id. (emphasizing that it was "because of the failure of the American authorities to comply
with their obligation under Article 36" that "the procedural default rule prevented counsel for the
LaGrands to effectively challenge their convictions and sentences other than on United States
constitutional grounds"). This element of irritation was also presented in the Avena judgment, when the
ICJ complained, "it has been the failure of the United States itself to inform [foreign prisoners] that may
have precluded counsel from being in a position to have raised the question of a violation of the Vienna
Convention in the initial trial." Mexico v. United States, 2004 I.C.J. 12, 57, 113 (Mar. 31).
85. See, e.g., John F. Murphy, Medellin v. Texas: Implications of the Supreme Court's Decision
for the United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
247, 258-59 (2008) (describing the timing of these events, and contrasting Germany's decision in
LaGrand with that of Paraguay in Breard).
86. Article 59 of the ICJ Statute states that each decision of the ICJ "has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case." Accordingly, Mexico might not have been
able to strongly rely solely on the LaGrand judgment for the proposition that an earlier ICJ judgment
had directly prohibited the execution of its nationals.
87. Mexico v. U.S., 2004 I.C.J. 12 (March 31). Mexico's initial filing in the case was made on
January 9, 2003, while the LaGrandjudgment is dated June 27, 2001. Id. at 17, 1.
88. 2004 I.C.J. at 56-57, 112 (quoting the ICJ's determination in LaGrand, and confirming that
"[t]his statement of the Court seems equally valid in relation to the present case, where a number of
Mexican nationals have been placed exactly in such a situation.").
89. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
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Bustillo, was a Honduran national convicted in Virgina. Even though Sanchez-
Llamas was a Mexican national, the ICJ Avena judgment did not apply directly to
him because he was not one of the death row inmates expressly covered by
Mexico's action in Avena. Once again, the procedural default issue arose because
Bustillo had not raised his Article 36 claim until after his conviction had run its
course through Virginia trial and appellate courts and become final. The Supreme
Court acknowledged the LaGrand and Avena rulings," but nevertheless held again
that state procedural default rules could trump protections under Article 36.
It was two years after the Supreme Court's ruling in Sanchez-Llamas that one
of the Mexican detainees covered by the ICJ's Avena judgment was granted
certiorari by the Supreme Court. That was Medellin, and as noted above, the
Supreme Court decided for the third time that state procedural default rules could
block relief under Article 36. This time, however, the Supreme Court's ruling was
in direct contravention of an ICJ judgment that applied to the specific defendant
before the Supreme Court.
B. Procedural Defaults as a "Dead End" in the Maze for Tardy Defendants
In addressing the effect, of procedural default rules on Article 36 protections,
the best place to start is the text of Article 36 itself. As noted earlier, paragraph 2
of Article 36 provides that:
The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to
the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full
effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
Article are intended. 9'
On one hand, this clause supports the argument that procedural bar rules can
trump Article 36 rights to the extent that they affirm that the rights "shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State." On
the other hand, the clause can be read to negate that effect to the extent that the
procedural bar rules would not "enable full effect to be given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under this Article are intended."
In its three Article 36 opinions, the Supreme Court has given primary weight
to the first part of paragraph 2, the provision affirming that Article 36 rights shall
be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State.9
The Court has simply not given effect to the second part of paragraph 2. In Breard,
the Court merely recited the first part of paragraph 2, and asserted its availability
90. Id. at 352 ("[Bustillo] argues that since Breard, the ICJ has interpreted the Vienna
Convention to preclude the application of procedural default rules to Article 36 claims.").
91. VCCR, art. 36(2).
92. The Court has also maintained that, even apart from paragraph 2 of Article 36, "the
procedural rules of domestic law generally govern the implementation of an international treaty."
Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 356 (citing Breard, 523 U.S. at 375).
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for allowing procedural bars to trump Article 36.1 Rather than moving on to the
second part of paragraph 2, the Court instead noted the effects of the "last-in-time-
is-best-in-right" rule governing the domestic legal relationship in the US between
treaty provisions and federal statutes. The Court viewed the passage of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in 1996 as an intervening statute
that would supersede any residual protection afforded by paragraph 2."
In Sanchez-Llamas, the Court reiterated Breard's reliance on the first part of
paragraph 2, and then dealt with the second part by providing a somewhat detailed
description of the importance of procedural default rules in adversary judicial
systems.95 In Medellin, the Court did not directly address paragraph 2 at all."
By contrast, the ICJ has given substantial weight to the second part of
paragraph 2 in its two Article 36 final judgments. In LaGrand, the ICJ criticized
the application of a procedural default rule to trump Article 36 protections. The
ICJ first allowed that, in itself, "the rule does not violate Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention."97 However, the ICJ noted that, by the time Germany was made aware
of the LaGrands' situation and was able to provide some assistance to them,
"because of the failure of the American authorities to comply with their obligation
under Article 36, the procedural default rule prevented counsel for the LaGrands to
effectively challenge their convictions and sentences other than on US
constitutional grounds."9  Accordingly, the ICJ concluded that, "[u]nder these
circumstances, the procedural default rule had the effect of preventing 'full effect
[from being] given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article
are intended,' and thus violated paragraph 2 of Article 36."'
In its 2004 Avena judgment, the ICJ quoted from that section of the LaGrand
judgment, and then noted that:
93. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375-76 ("By not asserting his Vienna Convention claim in state court,
Breard failed to exercise his rights under the Vienna convention in conformity with the laws of the
United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia.").
94. Id. at 376 ("[fln 1996 .... Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA) .... Breard's ability to obtain relief based on violations of the Vienna Convention is
subject to this subsequently enacted rule .... This rule prevents Breard from establishing that the
violation of his Vienna Convention rights prejudiced him.").
95. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 356 ("This reasoning [that procedural default rules fail to give
'full effect' to the purposes of Article 36 contrary to its terms] overlooks the importance of procedural
default rules in an adversary system ... ").
96. In Medellin, the Court states, "we reiterated in Sanchez-Llamas what we held in Breard, that
'absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the
implementation of the treaty in that State."' Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 517 (2008) (citing
Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 351; Breard, 523 U.S. at 375). This statement, however, goes to the
general rule of interpretation that the Court there asserted, rather than to the text-based analysis of
paragraph 2. The Court next contends that, "there is no statement in the Optional Protocol, the UN
Charter, or the ICJ Statute that supports the notion that ICJ judgments displace state procedural rules."
Id. Finally, the Court expresses alarm at "the consequences of Medellin's argument," asserting that
under his argument an ICJ judgment "is not only binding domestic law but is also unassailable." This
assertion by the Court addresses the scope of ICJ authority rather than the meaning of paragraph 2.
97. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 497.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 498.
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[T]he procedural default rule has not been revised, nor has any provision
been made to prevent its application in cases where it has been the failure
of the United States itself to inform that may have precluded counsel from
being in a position to have raised the question of a violation of the Vienna
Convention in the initial trial.10
The ICJ thus determined that, "the procedural default rule may continue to
prevent courts from attaching legal significance to the ... violation of the rights set
forth in Article 36. ' ' Since, unlike the situation in LaGrand, most of the Avena
detainees had not yet progressed to the stage where "there was no further
possibility of judicial re-examination," the ICJ decided it would be "premature" to
conclude that violations of Article 36, paragraph 2 had already occurred in those
cases.0 2 It is understandable that the ICJ would take this position. The second part
of paragraph 2 of Article 36 certainly limits the application of the laws and
regulations of the receiving State to those laws and regulations that do not impair
the full effect of the rights accorded under that Article. And procedural default
rules, by precluding the assertion of those rights, do tend to impair the full effect of
the Article's provisions granting those rights.
However, the Supreme Court has spoken on this point, and the procedural
default rules seem to be squarely supported in its Breard opinion. The Court points
out that state procedural default rules can preclude the assertion of constitutional
rights under the US Constitution, and asserts that it would be anomalous to allow
preclusion of the assertion of constitutional rights, but not allow preclusion of
rights under treaties.0 3 As noted above, the Court seems to claim that procedural
default rules are founded in the fundamental notion of an adversary system of
justice that "relies chiefly on the parties to raise significant issues and present them
to the courts in the appropriate manner at the appropriate time for adjudication."'"
The Court thus seems to be arguing that adherence to procedural default rules is
critical to the effective operation of an adversarial system of justice. Among other
things, the implication seems to be that procedural default rules prevent counsel
from purposely "squirreling away" arguments in abeyance. Absent a procedural
bar rule, defense counsel could surreptitiously reserve each successive argument
solely for later proceedings. The concern would be that counsel could conceivably
bring up each new argument in a new proceeding, only after adverse
determinations against previously stated arguments in earlier proceedings. This
would appear to be inherent in the Court's explanation that the "consequence of
100. Avena, supra note 4, at 57.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) ("[A]lthough treaties are recognized by our
Constitution as the supreme law of the land, that status is no less true of provisions of the Constitution
itself, to which rules of procedural default [also] apply."). The Court then cited this language in
Sanchez-Llamas. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 351-52 (2006).
104. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 356 (emphasis in original).
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failing to raise a claim for adjudication at the proper time is generally forfeiture of
that claim."'0 5
There is some merit to the Court's perspective in this regard, but the Court is
woefully far off the mark in at least one respect. The Court goes on to decry a
"parade of horribles," asserting that if procedural defaults are invalidated for
Article 36 claims, "rules such as statutes of limitations and prohibitions against
filing successive habeas petitions must also yield in the face of Article 36
claims.""'°  This deduction is plainly unwarranted. The reason that procedural
defaults so offend Article 36 is that Article 36 guarantees the provision of
information to a criminal defendant in detention, and the benefits of Article 36
cannot be enjoyed by a criminal defendant unless he or she knows about them. The
receipt of knowledge about the benefits of Article 36 is the purpose of the Article.
For a state to refuse to inform a detainee of these benefits, as it is required to do,
and then penalize the detainee for not having been informed about them, is circular.
No such circularity arises regarding statutes of limitation or quantitative limits on
habeas petitions. Procedural bars arising from such limitations could well be
opposable against detainees without penalizing them for a lack of information that
it was the state's treaty-based duty to supply.
In any event, the continuing vitality of state procedural default rules against
detainees who have not asserted Article 36 claims within applicable time limits
appears certain. Accordingly, as far as the Supreme Court is concerned, no judicial
relief is available to detainees who have not asserted an Article 36 claim within the
time frame required by applicable state law. The procedural default rule thus
represents the first of several Dead Ends in the Medellin Maze.
C. A Second Probable "Dead End": Individual Enforceability
As noted above, the interpretation of a treaty often involves the question of
whether rights mentioned in the treaty are judicially enforceable by individuals in
domestic courts. That has been a key element of contention in recent years as to
VCCR Article 36.
Significant international authorities have lined up on the side of individual
enforceability. In both its LaGrand and Avena judgments, the ICJ concluded that
"Article 36, paragraph 1 creates individual rights."'0 7  Granted, in both those
proceedings, as is required under the ICJ Statute,"8 the litigating party was Mexico
rather than the individuals involved. However, the logical consequences of the ICJ
view are relatively clear. If the ICJ believes that Article 36 creates individual
105. Id. at 356-57.
106. Id. at 357.
107. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 494, quoted and cited in Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 36.
108. Article 34, paragraph 1 of the ICJ Statute declares that "[o]nly states may be parties in cases
before this Court." Accordingly, the ICJ would rarely have a basis for directly determining whether any
particular domestic court would be required to hear a claim of treaty violation brought by an individual.
Such an issue could arise if a treaty were to provide for direct enforcement through court proceedings
brought by an individual. But the ICJ Statute makes no such assertion.
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rights, it could well follow that those rights would need to be of the type that are
individually enforceable in domestic jurisdictions. Neither the LaGrand judgment,
nor the Avena judgment requires this result, but such a result would probably be
most consonant with those judgments.
In addition, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("IACHR") issued an
advisory opinion on October 1, 19 9 9 .101 Mexico requested this advisory opinion,
and the consideration of Mexico's application by the IACHR also took into account
submissions by over half a dozen other North, South and Central American states,
including the US, as well as by the Inter-American Commission. ' The IACHR
concluded on this point that Article 36 "endows a detained foreign national with
individual rights that are the counterpart to the host State's correlative duties...
,",, The clear implication of this language was that the IACHR expected states
subject to its jurisdiction that had ratified the VCCR to allow individual
enforcement of Article 36.
Academic commentary offered in connection with Medellin and its attendant
issues has been to varying effects regarding individual enforceability. In a recent
symposium at Suffolk Law School, and in an account later published in the Suffolk
Transnational Law Review, this point was addressed by some of the participants,
specifically regarding the rights at issue in Medellin."2 None of them found against
individual enforceability, and those who addressed the point either favored
individual enforceability or seemed decidedly open to it."3
On the other hand, some academic commentators have addressed the issue of
individual enforceability of treaties after Medellin in more general terms. They
tend to view the majority opinion in Medellin as boding poorly for private judicial
enforcement of treaty rights. This emanates from, among other factors, the Court's
allusion in Medellin to the assertion in the American Law Institute's Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States that "international
agreements... generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause
of action in domestic courts."" 4
Especially cogent in this regard is commentary by John Parry, who states that
the Medellin majority opinion generally "seems hostile to enforcement of treaties in
109. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of Guarantees of Due
Process of Law, Inter. Am. Ct. H.R. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 (Oct. 1, 1999) [hereinafter IACHR
Advisory Opinion].
I10. Id. at 9-34.
111. Id. atS0.
112. Two of the commentators who have most directly addressed the issue up to now are Jordan
Paust and Christina Cema, whose observations are discussed in the immediately following note.
113. Paust, supra note 67 ("1 agree with the ICJ, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and
others that individuals have rights under the Convention."); Christina M. Cema, Medellin v. Texas: A
Symposium Lead Article: The Right to Consular Notification as a Human Right, 31 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 419, 456 (2008) ("The ICJ Judgments in the LaGrand case and the Avena case
were both issued prior to the U.S. withdrawal from the Protocol and held that Article 36 of the VCCR
confers an individually enforceable right to consular notification.").
114. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 907 cmt. a (1986)).
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federal court proceedings brought by individuals against state actors."' 5 In fact,
Parry goes so far as to say that the decision "articulates a presumption against
finding individual rights in treaties" and "stands against treaty enforcement by
individuals."" 6 Paul Stephan finds it clear that, after Medellin, "one cannot claim
that the Supreme Court accepts a presumption in favor of judicial enforcement of
treaty provisions."" 7 Christina Cema notes that two of the ICJ judges who sat for
the LaGrand judgment "questioned the majority's finding that an obligation to
individuals had been breached, rather than solely an obligation to the State.""'
The determinations of US courts that have considered the issue do not, on
balance, support individual enforceability. Of the half-dozen or so recent court of
appeals cases that have involved the status of the VCCR before US domestic
courts, only one majority ruling has found that the protections of Article 36 are
judicially enforceable by private individuals. One of the earliest points at which
this issue was judicially addressed was in the Fourth Circuit decision in Breard v.
Pruett,"9 one of the precursors to the Supreme Court's Breard ruling. Although the
three-judge panel only dealt with the Article 36 claim from the standpoint of
procedural defaults, and did not address the issue of individual enforceability, the
concurring opinion by Judge Butzner stated that, "[tihe Vienna Convention is a self
executing treaty-it provides rights to individuals rather than merely setting out the
obligations of signatories. The text emphasizes that the right of consular notice and
assistance is the citizen's."'' 0
The year after Breard, the Ninth Circuit considered whether evidence secured
in violation of Article 36 needed to be suppressed; in determining that suppression
was not required, the court did not directly address the general question of
individual judicial enforceability.' Nevertheless, two dissenting opinions were
more charitable to notions of individual judicial enforceability.' A year later, in
the case of United States v. Li,23 the First Circuit majority also found that evidence
obtained in violation of Article 36 did not need to be suppressed, without
specifically addressing individual enforceability. One concurring opinion
115. Parry, supra note 11, at 60.
116. Id. at 36. For a filler discussion of the appellate cases before Medellin and how they relate
to the issue of private judicial enforceability, see id at 63-67.
117. Paul B. Stephan, Open Doors, 13 LEWIs & CLARK L. REV. 11, 11 (2009). In this respect, he
answers earlier arguments by Carlos Manuel Vizquez to the effect that the Supremacy Clause supports a
presumption in favor of self-execution. Vdzquez, supra note 13. Although this colloquy relates
specifically to self-executing status, a treaty cannot be judicially enforced by an individual, standing on
its own, unless it is at least self-executing.
118. Cema, supra note 17, at 445 (referencing the separate opinions of Judges Shi and Oda).
119. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998).
120. Id. at 622 (Butzner, J., concurring; internal citation omitted). The quoted passage betrays
confusion between the concept of self-execution and individual enforceability, but in point of substance
seems to be referencing the idea of individual enforceability.
121. See generally United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 1999).
122. See id. at 889-90 (Boochever, J., dissenting); id at 895 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
123. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56 (1 st Cir. 2000).
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maintained that Article 36 rights were not individually enforceable,"' and one
argued that they were.
25
The Fifth Circuit subsequently found against individual enforceability in
United States v. Jimenez-Nava,26 a non-capital case involving counterfeit
immigration documents. In Jimenez-Nava, the Fifth Circuit presented a detailed
analysis and determined that "the presumption" against "judicially enforceable
rights.., ought to be conclusive" in that case. 27
Three years later, in the precursor to the Medellin Supreme Court opinion, the
Fifth Circuit declared, "we are bound to apply this holding [Jimenez-Nava], the
subsequent decision in LaGrand notwithstanding, until either the Court sitting en
banc or the Supreme Court say otherwise." ' 8 Of course, no such contrary superior
opinion has yet emerged. In fact, the Oregon Supreme Court then followed suit
when, in its version of Sanchez-Llamas, it concluded that "Article 36 does not
create rights to consular access or notification that a detained individual can
enforce in a judicial proceeding.
29
In 2007, in Cornejo v. County of San Diego, a Ninth Circuit majority directly
held that Article 36 rights were not judicially enforceable by private persons.3 °
Once again, however, there was a dissent maintaining that such rights should be
individually enforceable.' In 2008, both the Second and Eleventh Circuits issued
opinions involving Article 36 violations; in neither case did the majority find in
favor of private judicial enforceability. In the Second Circuit case, the court never
addressed the issue of individual judicial enforcement,' and the Eleventh Circuit
determined that Article 36 is not privately judicially enforceable.'33 With the
Eleventh Circuit decision, however, there was a "special concurrence" finding
individual judicial enforceability. "
The Seventh Circuit is the only Circuit that has issued a majority opinion
finding in favor of private judicial enforcement of Article 36 rights, and it did so
twice as a result of two successive considerations of the same case.'"
The Supreme Court has declined to resolve this issue three times. In Breard,
the Court noted in passing that Article 36 "arguably confers on an individual the
right to consular assistance following arrest."'3 6 This brief comment probably
created an inference that the Court was assuming, without deciding, that Article 36
affords the capacity for individual judicial enforcement. Next, in its Sanchez-
124. See id. at 67 (Selya, J. and Boudin, J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 69-70 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
126. United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2001).
127. Id. at 198.
128. Medellin v. Dredkte, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (2004).
129. Oregon v. Sanchez-Llamas, 338 Ore. 267, 276 (2005) (en banc).
130. Comejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 863 (9th Cir. 2007).
131. See id. at 864 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
132. Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 2008).
133. Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 825 (1 1th Cir. 2008).
134. See id. at 829 -30, 832 (Rogers J., special concurrence).
135. Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 382 (7th Cir. 2005), withdrawn, Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822,
835 (7th Cir. 2007)
136. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998)
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Llamas majority opinion, the Court explicitly found it "unnecessary to resolve the
question whether the Vienna Convention grants individuals enforceable rights."''
Accordingly, in that opinion, the Supreme Court majority explicitly declared, "we
assume, without deciding, that Article 36 does grant [the defendants] such
rights."'38 Finally, the Court in its Medellin majority opinion "assumes without
deciding" that "Article 36 grants foreign nationals 'an individually enforceable
right to request that their consular officers be notified of their detention.. .. '"
The arguments against individual enforceability of Article 36 are relatively
strong. As more than one court has noted,'" the preamble to the VCCR expressly
states that "the purpose of [consular] privileges and immunities is not to benefit
individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular posts
on behalf of their respective States."'' This language could be read to disavow the
ability of individuals to rely on any provisions of the VCCR as individual legal
claimants. Even if read to be limited to those aspects of the VCCR described as
"privileges and immunities," Article 36 is one of the provisions included within the
Convention's section on "privileges and immunities," and so it would be subject to
this limitation.'"2 The IACHR, at a crucial point in its Advisory Opinion, quoted
the aforementioned language from the preamble, and allowed that the VCCR would
"not appear to be intended to confer rights to individuals; the rights of consular
communication and notification are, 'first and foremost', rights of States."'' 3
However, immediately after making this momentary concession, the IACHR noted
that "the 'individuals' to whom [the preamble] refers are those who perform
consular functions," and that "the clarification [in the preamble] was intended to
make it clear that the privileges and immunities granted to them were for the
performance of their functions.'" The implication seems to be that the exclusion
of rights only vitiates putative rights of consular officials and employees, and that
the rights of other sending State nationals are not thereby excluded in the preamble.
But this argument is unpersuasive because the limitation to consular officials could
just as easily cut the other way. If consular officials, who are the main
beneficiaries of the VCCR's privileges and immunities, cannot even claim
individual rights under it, it is all the more arguable that mere citizens of the
sending State would be in a less optimal position to do so.
137. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 343 (2006).
138. Id.
139. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008).
140. E.g., United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 196 (5th Cir. 2001) ("This language
would appear to preclude any possibility that individuals may benefit from it when they travel abroad,
even, perhaps, if they are among the consular corps."). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights also
addresses this argument, as described in the text accompanying notes 143-44, infra.
141. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 3, pmbl., cl. 5.
142. Id. ch. II, arts. 28-39.
143. IACHR Advisory Opinion, supra note 109, at 47, 73.
144. Id. at 47, 74.
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Some courts seize upon the wording of Article 36, which in subparagraph l(b)
refers to the "rights" of the detainees it references.'45 However, as noted earlier,
many international treaties use the word "rights" in contexts where it is clear that
domestic judicial relief for individuals is neither required nor even contemplated.
It is especially telling that the ICCPR, one of the foremost conventions in the field
of human rights, is in this category.'"
The IACHR also cited interpretive methodology as a basis for finding that
Article 36 imparted individual rights. It stated that the question is not so much
whether Article 36 guarantees individual human rights, but "whether it concerns
the protection of human rights" within the Court's geographic ambit.'47 The
IACHR attaches importance to this interpretive distinction as a result of its past
jurisprudence on interpretation. But US federal courts are not obliged to adopt the
IACHR's interpretative traditions, and they are unlikely to do so.
The findings against individual enforceability also have noted that a relatively
small number of provisions of the VCCR address the position of individual
nationals. In Jimenez-Nava, for example, the Fifth Circuit panel declared that
"only one article out of 79 in the Treaty even arguably protects individual non-
consular officials."'48  While one might quibble with the precision of this
statement,"9 it is certainly the case that the vast majority of the VCCR's provisions
do not touch on individual nationals of either the sending or receiving State.
In arguing against individual enforceability, it is also noteworthy that the
origin of the VCCR is the ILC, as described earlier.' When the ILC was preparing
drafts of treaties such as the VCCR, it was engaged primarily in the codification of
the existing standards of international law and practice, through vehicles such as
the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, and the VCDR. It was plainly not a primary goal of the ILC at that point
to draft treaties dealing with individual rights. Provisions such as Article 36 of the
VCCR are included to help assure the effective operation of consular services,
rather than to establish human rights norms.
145. E.g., Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 196 (emphasizing the impact of some of "the references to
'rights' in Article 36"); IACHR Advisory Opinion, supra note 109, at 48, 78 ("The text in question
makes it clear that both the consular officer and the national of the sending State have that right .... ").
146. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.171; see
also supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
147. IACHR Advisory Opinion, supra note 109, at 46, 72; id. at 47, 76 (emphasis in both
original passages).
148. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 196.
149. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 3, art. 37(b) (requiring a
receiving State "to inform the competent consular post without delay of any case where the appointment
of a guardian or trustee appears to be in the interests of a minor or other person lacking full capacity"),
which, since it involves the protection of minors or vulnerable adults, could be read to involve
protection of individuals with relative ease. Id. art. 5. And the blanket description in Article 5 of all the
"Consular Functions" normally carried on by consular posts includes "helping and assisting nationals,
both individuals and bodies corporate, of the sending State," id art. 5(e), and safeguarding the interests
of nationals ... in cases of succession mortis causa. Id. art. 5(g).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 36-46.
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Perhaps the most powerful argument against an individual rights interpretation
has been offered by Christina Cema, who has trenchantly suggested that if Article
36 really were meant to provide for personal human rights of detainees, Article 36
would not make the satisfaction of those rights optional with the sending State
consular officers, as it plainly does. 5' Article 36 leaves any and all actions in aid of
sending State nationals to the discretion of sending State consular officers in the
receiving State. It is difficult to see how this could be the case if Article 36 rights
were personal human rights of detainees.'
On balance, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would find that Article
36 creates personal rights that are enforceable by individuals in US courts. The
Court seems especially indisposed after Medellin to recognize such rights as a
general matter, and the arguments against such rights in this context seem
substantive and formidable. Determining whether a finding against such rights is
the best resolution of the issue is not the point of this article; rather, this article only
hopes to elucidate what the most likely result would be in the federal courts.
Accordingly, the "individual rights" aspect of Article 36 constitutes a dramatic
Dead End in the Medellin Maze.
D. Enforcement Through the Executive Branch as a Certain "Dead End"
In investigating possible escape routes from the Medellin Maze, this article
now addresses the possibility that a US President could order American courts to
insist on Article 36 compliance in their proceedings, or order police officials within
US states to abide by the terms of Article 36 in their arrest procedures. Indeed, on
the Medellin facts, President George W. Bush did issue a presidential memorandum
to the Attorney General. However, the memorandum was not directed towards the
general enforcement of Article 36, but rather specifically to the "reconsideration
and review" mandated by the ICJ's Avena judgment. Nevertheless, the Court's
treatment of that presidential memorandum is indicative of how the Court would
treat any presidential attempt to enforce Article 36 generally. A presidential
mandate in this area is apt to result in another Dead End in the Medellin Maze.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's Medellin opinion appears to be on reasonably
firm ground when it refuses to give effect to the presidential memorandum
President Bush issued. The key provision of the memorandum reads:
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by
the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the
United States will discharge its international obligations under the
151. See Cema, supra note 113, at 427.
152. It is conceivable that detainees might value simply the ability to contact their consular
officers, even if the officers decide not to assist them. However, the incremental and marginal nature of
any utility thereby experienced by the detainees makes the existence of an individual right seem less
compelling. Under these circumstances, after all, detainees' communication with the consular officers
would have no practical effect on the detainees. In this respect, the situation is very different from the
dynamics that result from the acknowledged "right" to communicate with counsel, for example.
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decision of the International Court of Justice in [Avena], by having State
courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of
comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that
decision.
5 3
Even the text of the memorandum hints at its own deficiency. The
awkwardness of the locution, "the United States will discharge its obligations ...
by having State courts give effect to the decision" bespeaks its problematic
character. A more direct and less awkward way of communicating the apparently
intended idea would have been to say: "I, as President, shall assure that the United
States discharges its obligations through my directive, which I hereby transmit,
ordering state courts to give effect to the decision."
Of course, it is difficult to believe that any US President would issue such a
memorandum. This is because the language of command, "I hereby order state
courts to give effect," would tend to remind the reader that the President does not
have the authority to require state courts to do anything of the kind. The key
realization here is the requirement that judicial operations maintain the required
degree of constitutional independence. As far back as 1792, with the publication of
Hayburn's Case,"M it has been clear Supreme Court doctrine that the Executive has
no power to intervene in federal judicial proceedings. And the strictures of
Hayburn 's Case apply to intervention in federal courts; any attempted interference
in state courts should be all the more constitutionally problematic. The Supreme
Court's use of the phrase, "by having the State courts give effect" seeks to avoid
language, such as the posited language above, that would draw attention to its own
invalidity.'55 But this is to no avail, because the resulting awkwardness makes clear
the linguistic feint that the Executive attempted in issuing this memorandum.
In its Medellin opinion, the Supreme Court makes relatively short work of the
suggestion that the President has the authority to effectuate an order of the kind that
President Bush issued in the Medellin situation. The Court does not rely on the
broad separation of powers concerns noted above but, in response to the arguments
presented by the Executive, addresses the nature of the treaties involved. The
Court refers to the UN Charter and the Optional Protocol to the VCCR, 56 and
suggests that giving effect to the President's memorandum would allow the
President to "unilaterally convert[] a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing
one."'57 Presumably, if either the UN Charter or the Optional Protocol specifically
gave executive officers in adhering countries the authority to influence court
proceedings, and if those agreements were self-executing in the US, the Court
153. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491,502-03 (2008) (citing the application to petition for cert.).
154. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
155. See infra text of Presidential Memorandum, provided in accompanying text at note 153.
156. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna
Convention, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325 (1970). The US initially entered into this opportunity
simultaneously with its adoption of the VCCR, but withdrew from the Optional Protocol in 2005,
shortly after the ICJ issued its judgment in Avena. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 500.
157. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 525.
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might have decided the question in another way. But neither agreement contains
such a specific grant of power, and the Court clearly views both agreements as non-
self-executing.
The Medellin Court also considers the possibility that the President might have
inherent constitutional foreign affairs power to issue a document such as his
memorandum to the Attorney General. The proponents of the memorandum were
probably hoping that it could be analogized to the presidential claims-settlement
orders in cases like United States v. Belmont5 ' and United States v. Pink.'59 As the
Court pointed out, those cases involved factual circumstances of a distinct kind."6
In those situations, the President ordered that funds being held under state law be
disposed of in certain ways pursuant to executive agreements the President had
concluded with the then nascent Soviet Union. The relevant facts thus involved a
particular kind of executive agreement-that is, the kind of agreement regarding
recognition of foreign states and governments-that is absent from the facts of
Medellin and other cases regarding Article 36 enforcement.
Jordan Paust, advancing a view contrary to the Court's perspective, has stated
that, "under the Constitution state judges cannot" ignore "the mandate of the Avena
judgment or ... avoid its implementation."' 161 He accordingly concludes that "after
the President's directive, the state courts are left basically where they had been
without his directive, i.e., with a minimal conforming discretion to choose
appropriate means for review and reconsideration of convictions and sentences. "162
At the very least, it would seem that under Paust's approach, the presidential
memorandum should have been given effect. As noted earlier, however, any
presidential directive regarding the conduct of proceedings in state courts would
encounter substantial separation of powers and federalism issues.
Again, the focus of this article here is not to define what the most correct view
of such issues might be, but to identify what perspective the Court is likely to
adopt. Given that the Court was unwilling to give effect to the President's
memorandum when it was designed to implement the UN Charter, Optional
Protocol, and ICJ Statute, it is unlikely to do so when the rule contained in a
presidential order is Article 36 itself. Indeed, it is clear that any attempt to use an
executive order or directive to enforce Article 36, without any supporting treaty
language or legislation, would be a Dead End in the Medellin Maze.
158. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
159. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
160. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531 ("The claims-settlement cases involve a narrow set of
circumstances: the making of executive agreements to settle civil claims between American citizens and
foreign governments or foreign nationals.").
161. Jordan J. Paust, Medellin, Avena, The Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant Executive
Authority, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 301 (2008), at 317.
162. Id.
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E. Enforcement Through Congress Quite Possibly Another "Dead End"
In its Medellin opinion, the Supreme Court repeatedly stresses that there is no
binding federal legislation implementing ICJ judgments. 63 These statements by the
Court seem to suggest that Congress could direct state courts to enforce ICJ
judgments directly if it passed federal legislation to that effect.' Furthermore, at a
critical juncture, the Court admits that "Congress could elect to give [ICJ
judgments] wholesale effect ... through implementing legislation, as it regularly
has."'65 The Court thus might seem to take the position that Congress could require
state courts to enforce ICJ judgments.
Given these statements by the Court, it is tempting to go further and suggest
that, as far as the Court is concerned, Congress could also legislatively require state
authorities to enforce Article 36. Activists and diplomatic and consular personnel
might well prefer this approach because it is more direct. Rather than simply
authorizing state courts to implement ICJ judgments requiring Article 36
compliance, Congress could require state governmental authorities, ab initio, to
inform detainees and notify consular officers, as specified in the Convention.
Surely, from a practical point of view, if Congress is able to do the one, efficiency
and operational logic, at least, would indicate that it should be able to do the other.
However, it is by no means clear that potentially applicable Supreme Court
precedents would allow Congress to enact legislation requiring that state law
enforcement officials comply with Article 36. It is well known that the Supreme
Court has, in recent years, been embarking on a judicial program of "New
Federalism."'' This judicial program has restricted Congress from directing states
to take certain actions traditionally considered within the scope of their sovereign
prerogatives.' 67 A federal statute requiring state officials to provide information to
detainees and notices to consular officials, pursuant to Article 36, would impose
such a requirement in the context of state officials' routine work in the enforcement
of state criminal laws. A federal mandate that state criminal laws be enforced
along certain lines, even if founded in international treaty obligations, could well
run afoul of the doctrine of New Federalism.
163. E.g., Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505 ("Only '[i]f the treaty contains stipulations which are self-
executing, that is, require no legislation to make them operative, [will] they have the force and effect of
a legislative enactment."') (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)) (implying that
Congress could give ICJ judgments force and effect through such a "legislative enactment"). Id at 506.
"Because none of these treaty sources creates binding federal law in the absence of implementing
legislation, and because it is uncontested that no such legislation exists, we conclude that the Avena
judgment is not automatically binding domestic law." Id. This quote implies that the judgment would
be binding law if such legislation existed, apparently conceding that such legislation could
constitutionally exist.
164. See supra the parenthetical explanations in note 163.
165. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 520.
166. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism:
Lessons from Coordination, 73 Mo. L. REv. 1185 (2008).
167. See, e.g., id. at 1190-92.
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The most cogent case in this context is also one of the foundational cases of
New Federalism, Printz v. United States.6 ' In Printz, the Court invalidated
provisions of a federal law that purported to require state law enforcement officers
to administer the provisions of federal gun control legislation. After considering
its view of history, constitutional structure, and earlier case law, the Court
determined that "congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal
laws is unconstitutional."'7 This review induced the Court to believe that the
Constitution established a system of "dual sovereignty," in which sovereignty
retained by the states was, although "residuary," still inviolable. 7' Federal control
of state officers was found to be generally impermissible, not merely for reasons of
federalism, but because it "would also have an effect upon ... the separation and
equilibration of powers between the three branches of the Federal Government
itself."'7 Finally, the Court concluded that, "the Federal Government may not
compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."'
73
It certainly would be arguable that a federal statute requiring state law
enforcement officers to abide by the terms of Article 36 would fall victim to the
same doctrine that was used to invalidate the gun control act in Printz. Such a
statute could easily be seen as "congressional action compelling state officers to
execute federal laws." The fact that the federal laws were authorized by a treaty
would not seem to be a terribly significant distinction from the Printz facts.
Treaties are the "Law of the Land" under the Supremacy Clause, 4 as is the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, on which the statute in Printz was founded.
States value their "dual sovereignty" and may view it as no less "inviolable" when
the federal law pertains to procedural requirements applicable upon the detention of
criminal defendants (such as are required by Article 36), than when it pertained to
the control of handgun sales. To the extent that federal mandates regarding
handgun sales restrictions could weaken presidential power through the
congressional allocation of duties to the states, such weakening could also be
experienced through congressional allocation of treaty compliance obligations to
the states. Finally, in requiring local state law enforcement officers to abide by
Article 36, Congress would certainly be "compelling the States to administer a
federal regulatory program."'7 Again, the fact that the program was based in treaty
obligations would arguably be immaterial.
168. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
169. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-59, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
170. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 ("Petitioners here ... contend that congressional action compelling
state officers to execute federal laws is unconstitutional."); id. at 918 ("[Clonstitutional practice we have
examined.., tends to negate the existence of the congressional power asserted here.").
171. Id. at 918-19.
172. Id. at 922.
173. Id. at 933 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)).
174. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .....
175. See supra text accompanying note 173.
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Craig Jackson squarely addresses the potential effect of New Federalism on
fact patterns of the type at issue in Medellin."6 As a general matter, he asserts that
"U.S. interests are best served by allowing the federal government to enter into
important international obligations without the impediment of notions of federalism
best applicable to domestic policy scenarios.""' In that connection, he quite
reasonably asserts that "the treaty power is not limited by the Tenth Amendment,"
since "a power that is constantly subject to attack under the rubric of federalism"''
would run counter to the principles of Missouri v. Holland"'
Jackson also considers the extent to which the ruling in Printz could impair
congressional enforcement of international law obligations. He suggests that "[t]he
reasoning in Printz [in] its domestic setting does not set the stage for an anti-
commandeering foreign policy principle."'' " This observation is based on the
concern-underlying part of the Printz rationale-that congressional devolution of
federal enforcement authority to the states can have decentralizing effects. Jackson
then asserts that, in matters of foreign policy, a greater danger of decentralization
comes from refusing to recognize the ability of Congress to enforce international
law and, instead, devolving this power to state enforcement."'
He also notes that the anti-commandeering principle that underlies much of the
New Federalism can work in favor of federal enforcement of international law. He
cogently observes that the anti-commandeering doctrine of cases such as New York
v. United States" are based in part on the idea that "federal officials should take
the heat for mandates forced upon state and local governments lest those
government officials be blamed for a particular federally mandated policy.""' 3 But
because "in foreign affairs there can be no mistaking the identity of the responsible
government," namely, the federal government, there is no basis for applying the
anti-commandeering doctrine where Congress is legislating to enforce obligations
under international law.'"
Notwithstanding these considerations, it is still quite possible that federal
courts would apply the Printz rationale to a federal statute enforcing Article 36. To
176. See generally Craig Jackson, The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine and Foreign-Policy
Federalism-The Missing Issue in Medellin v. Texas, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LAW REVIEW 335
(2008).
177. Id. at 350.
178. Id. at 358.
179. In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the US Congress to enact
a statute protecting migratory birds, based on a treaty between the US and Canada mandating such
protections, at a time when Congress would arguably not have had authority to enact the statute absent
the treaty. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
180. Jackson, supra note 176, at 371.
181. Id. at 368 ("[Justice Scalia] argues that by decentralizing the presidential function of
enforcing the laws of the United States, '[t]he unity in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government
would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to reduction, if Congress could...
require state officers to execute its laws.' . .. In matters of foreign policy as in Medellin, however, the
danger of decentralization is not in the disparate and uncoordinated implementation, but in the failure to
implement foreign policy brought on by decentralization.").
182. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
183. Jackson, supra note 176, at 374.
184. See id.
[Vol. 25:331
AN ESCAPE ROUTE FROM THE MEDELLIN MAZE
begin with, the anti-commandeering principle is inapposite in such a situation.
That principle, as developed in New York v. United States, restrains the ability of
Congress to require state legislatures to legislate in their own right.' The full
reference to "commandeering" in New York v. United States castigates the federal
government for passing a federal law that "commandeers the legislative process of
the States,"'86 that is, for telling state legislatures how to legislate.
That would not be a necessary feature of a federal statute requiring state
compliance with Article 36. Rather, for the federal statute to have effects that were
most direct, and most responsive to requirements of international law, it would
need to direct state law enforcement officers to comply with Article 36. This
would not necessarily require state legislation. It would, however, involve
"pressing the state law enforcement officers into the federal service,"'87 the type of
action directly at issue in Printz, rather than in New York v. United States.
Accordingly, commandeering of the type described in New York v. United States is
not at issue here, whereas the Printz rationale is.
The Court's concern in Printz about decentralization can, if taken at face
value, impose serious and counter-intuitive consequences. It is a kind of
"centralization" that can prevent Congress from imposing uniform behavioral
standards on law enforcement authorities in an area of substantial national concern:
handgun sales. Similarly, the Medellin result allows different states throughout the
country to allow for Article 36 relief, or not, based on individuated judicial
procedural rules. If the Printz concern for centralization, such as it is, requires
invalidation of congressional legislation imposing uniform police behavior in
handgun control, it is difficult to see why it might not also require invalidation of
congressional legislation imposing the uniform police behavior prescribed by
VCCR Article 36.
It might be argued that international law stands on different constitutional
footing than the Commerce Clause. That is, one might assert that a stronger degree
of uniform behavior across states is necessary to implement the former, rather than
the latter. However, proponents of New Federalism have been creative in
attempting to debunk the necessity for federally imposed uniformity of
185. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 175. Justice O'Connor criticizes the so-called "take
title" feature of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 because the two
provisions of the Act involved with this issue would have been either "no different than a
congressionally compelled subsidy from state governments to radioactive waste producers" or
"indistinguishable from an Act of Congress directing the States to assume the liabilities of certain state
residents." Id. at 175. The assumption by the state of either the subsidy or the liabilities would have
required legislative action by the state legislature. Accordingly, Justice O'Connor observes, for the
Court, that, "[s]tanding alone, this provision... would 'commandeer' state governments into the service
of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division
of authority between federal and state governments." Id.
186. Id. at 176 ("[T]he Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program," citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
187. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) ("Petitioners here object to being pressed
into federal service, and contend that congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal
laws is unconstitutional.").
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international law. Most recently, Robert Ahdieh has attempted to argue against
federal hegemony in enforcing international law, and has favored instead giving a
greater voice to the states, namely, putting faith in the ability of the states to engage
in "coordination" vis-A-vis external relations.'88 Before him, Curtis Bradley and
Jack Goldsmith argued that customary international law, previously thought to be
safely within the federal purview, should actually be viewed as an element of state
law. 8" And before that, David Golove alerted us to the revisionist types of views
that have attended continued examination of Missouri v. Holland.9" The views
involved in these observations have not yet been adopted by the Supreme Court.
But in the atmosphere of New Federalism and the Medellin decision, they need to
be taken quite seriously.
It can by no means be assured that federal courts will view the international
law context of Article 36 as deserving of any more federally imposed uniformity
than the gun safety law context of Printz. Accordingly, there is an appreciable
chance that direct federal legislation requiring states to comply with Article 36 will
be yet another Dead End in the Medellin Maze.
Of course, the Supreme Court in Avena leaves open the possibility that federal
legislation could enforce the Avena judgment itself, rather than Article 36 more
generally. In other words, the Supreme Court might view more favorably a federal
statute giving an ICJ judgment "wholesale effect."'' That would be a different
proposition than a general Article 36 enforcement statute, and would be a good deal
less useful. For one thing, the Avena judgment, by its terms, only applies to the
detainees and US states named in the judgment. Furthermore, it is far less useful,
and probably fatally impractical for defendants, to require an ICJ judgment every
time Article 36 is violated. In order for a federal statute to afford meaningful
vindication of Article 36 rights, it would probably need to address the state law
enforcement authorities directly. And that, as just noted, is a Dead End.
F. Enforcement by International Tribunals as Yet Another "Dead End"
The discussion so far has demonstrated that there are several Dead Ends to
federal judicial enforcement of Article 36 rights. We have seen that US courts are
probably predisposed to find that Article 36 protections cannot be enforced
judicially by individuals, that procedural default rules present a bar to tardy claims
by detainees, that unilateral actions by the Executive Branch to mandate such
protections have been and will be deemed invalid, and possibly even that the role
of Congress in enforcing such protections can be limited.
188. See generally Robert H. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New
Federalism: Lessons from Coordination, 73 Mo. L. REv. 1185 (2008).
189. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).
190. See generally David M. Golove, Treaty-Making Power and the Nation: The Historical
Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000).
191. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 520 (2008).
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In the face of these frustrations, one temptation is to seek enforcement of
Article 36 protections in international tribunals. Of course, the primary holding of
the Supreme Court's Medellin decision is that the ICJ's Avena judgment, which
attempts to enforce Article 36, does not constitute "directly enforceable federal law
that pre-empts state limitations on the filing of successive habeas petitions."'" The
language within that opinion is even more sweeping. At one point, the Court
heavily suggests that, as a general proposition, "ICJ judgments were not meant to
be enforceable in domestic courts."'93 The Court's chief reason for so concluding is
that the view that "ICJ decisions are automatically enforceable as domestic law is
fatally undermined by the enforcement structure established by Article 94" of the
UN Charter."9  The Court also finds in the text of the ICJ Statute evidence it
considers persuasive for the proposition that "the ICJ's Avena judgment does not
automatically constitute federal law judicially enforceable in United States
courts."'95 These considerations also primarily motivated the Court in Sanchez-
Llamas when it declared that "[n]othing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ
suggests that its interpretations were intended to be conclusive on our courts.""'
Also in that decision, the Court based its analysis in part on the observation that,
where treaties are concerned, "determining their meaning as a matter of federal law
'is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department,' headed by the
'one supreme Court' established by the Constitution."'97
In terms used by Margaret McGuinness, the Court's perspective on the direct
application of ICJ judgments could be called "internal/constitutional."'9 As such,
in the Court's view, it derives its judicial authority from the Constitution and its
prescribed role in the constitutional framework. This is consistent with an entirely
"dualist" notion of the relationship between domestic law and international law.'"
If the Court adopted what theorists call a "monist" view of that relationship,2" the
192. Id. at 491.
193. Id. at 509.
194. Id. at 511. Article 94(1) of the UN Charter imposes the requirement that "[elach Member of
the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any
case to which it is a party." U.N. Charter art. 94(1). The Court maintains that this method of enforcing
ICJ judgments would not have been established if ICJ judgments were required to be independently
enforceable in domestic courts. Id.
195. Id. at 511. The Court has two basic reasons for this: the ICJ Statute's statement that the ICJ
"can hear disputes only between nations, not individuals," id. (citing Article 34(1) of the ICJ Statute),
and the Statute's insistence that '[t]he decision of the [ICJ] has no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case."' Id. (citing Article 59 of the ICJ Statute).
196. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 354 (2006) (citing Articles 34 and 59 of the ICJ
Statute and Article 94(1) of the UN Charter).
197. Id. at 353 (citing Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).
198. McGuinness, supra note 17, at 234 ("The Internal/Constitutionalist narrative frames the issue
of America's interaction with international law from the inside looking out. It adopts a vocabulary
reflecting the history, internal structures, and jurisprudential traditions of the Constitution.").
199. Id. ("This narrative is consistent with the doctrine of dualism, which posits that international
law is not superior to national law, but rather remains outside and parallel to the Constitution.").
200. A sample definition of the monist perspective is offered by Malcolm Shaw in his discussion
of some of the theories of Hans Kelsen: "International law and municipal law are not two separate
systems but one interlocking structure and the former is supreme. Municipal law finds its ultimate
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Court might have viewed ICJ decisions differently in Sanchez-Llamas and
Medellin. However, the dualist perspective seems firmly entrenched in the Court. 0
Paul Stephan has presented an argument regarding the relationship between the
domestic judiciary and international tribunals generally.202 He considers whether
international comity might be used as a rationale supporting the domestic judicial
enforcement of rulings by treaty-based international tribunals. He maintains that
"dynamic reciprocity characterizes interstate relations," and that this dynamism is
the "core premise" of the comity concept.23 He defines this dynamism as being
composed of reciprocity, non-recognition (of foreign judgments that do not
reciprocally recognize US judgments), dynamic interaction, and discrimination
(allowing respect for judgments from cooperative states and disallowing it for
judgments from uncooperative states).21 In his view, "states lack the capacity to
respond reciprocally to the behavior of international dispute settlement bodies,"
and "these bodies also find it hard to respond reciprocally to state behavior.""2 5
Accordingly, "whatever else may justify the willingness of US judges to enforce
the decisions of international dispute settlement bodies, comity cannot do the
job., 20
In view of the dualism described by McGuinness, as more than amply
demonstrated by Sanchez-Llamas and Medellin, the Court is extremely unlikely to
give effect to interpretations of Article 36 offered by supranational tribunals, even
apart from the ICJ. Stephan has demonstrated that the concept of comity would be
unlikely to furnish an alternative basis for giving them effect. Accordingly, the
prospect of using international tribunals as a means of enforcing Article 36 rights in
American courts is also clearly a Dead End.
G. Corrective Injunction Sought by Sending State as an Eleventh Amendment
"Dead End"
As previously described, several lower courts have determined that Article 36
and the VCCR do not establish rights that individuals can enforce directly in US
courts.0 7 It also was noted earlier that the Supreme Court demurred on the issue of
individual enforcement in Medellin,"8 and that the Court is unlikely to be receptive
to direct individual enforcement, if and when it decides to address the issue.2'°
justification in the rules of international law by a process of delegation within one universal normative
system." MALCOLM M. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (5th ed. 2003).
201. Shaw defines dualism in the context of his discussion of positivism, In his view, dualism
"stresses that the rules of the systems of international law and municipal law exist separately and cannot
purport to have an effect on, or overrule, the other." Id. at 122.
202. See generally Paul B. Stephan, Open Doors, 13 LEWIs & CLARK L. REv. 11 (2009).
203. Id. at 16.
204. Id. at 17-18.
205. Id. at 20.
206. Id.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 120-35.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
209. See supra text accompanying note 151.
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One avenue of litigation that circumvents the question of individual judicial
enforcement involves actions commenced by the detainee's sending State, rather
than the detainee individually. If the sending State challenges the violation of a
detainee's Article 36 rights in a US court, then the "real party" to the VCCR, the
state that is a party to the treaty, is the complaining party in court. Such a
challenge by a sovereign state can go forward consistent with the idea that
sovereign states, rather than private individuals, are parties to treaties and are the
primary entities that can complain about their violation. For such a procedure to go
forward, the treaty involved must be found to be self-executing, so that its
enforceability in domestic courts can be countenanced. But if the VCCR is held to
be self-executing, at least as an initial matter, it opens the door for Article 36 to be
enforced by sovereign states, thus avoiding the Dead End awaiting the pursuit of
individual injunctive relief.
This pattern was followed in at least one line of Article 36 cases: the district
court litigation in the Breard case in the late 1990s. Initially, Breard pursued relief
in federal court on his own behalf, but the District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia found against him in 1996.21' Breard appealed that ruling to the Fourth
Circuit, which affirmed the result against Breard in 1998.1 Meanwhile, the
Republic of Paraguay commenced a separate action in 1996 in the same court. In
this 1996 district court action, Paraguay asked the court to: (i) declare that the
Virginia state authorities violated the VCCR by failing to notify Paraguayan
consular officials of Breard's arrest; (ii) declare that those authorities continued to
violate the VCCR by failing to afford Paraguayan officials a meaningful
opportunity to give Breard assistance during the proceedings against him; (iii)
declare Breard's conviction void; (iv) enjoin the Virginia authorities from taking
any action based on the conviction and declare that any further action based on the
conviction would be a continuing violation of the VCCR; and (v) vacate Breard's
conviction and direct the Virginia authorities to abide by the VCCR during any
future proceedings against Breard.
In pursuing such relief, Paraguay was acting both in Breard's interest and in its
own interest. As a sovereign party to the VCCR, it had an independent interest in
assuring compliance with the terms of the treaty regarding its own nationals and
consular officials. This interest has importance apart from the fate of one particular
national in a particular case. As long as the court viewed the VCCR as self-
executing, and therefore enforceable in domestic court proceedings, Paraguay
would be in a position to advance its interests under the VCCR separate from the
interests of Breard in his individual case.
210. Breard v. Netherlands, 949 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Va. 1996).
211. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 617 (4th Cir. 1998).
212. Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (E.D. Va. 1996). Paraguay also
complained about violations of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between it and the
US, but the court's treatment of that treaty is identical to its treatment of the VCCR.
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In Paraguay's action, both Paraguay and the Virginia authorities viewed the
VCCR as self-executing, and the District Court did not dispute that view.2"3
Nevertheless, the District Court dismissed Paraguay's claims for relief for failure of
subject matter jurisdiction. The primary consideration precluding subject matter
jurisdiction was Virginia's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
214
The District Court noted that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits by a foreign
government against a state government or its officers in federal court. 25 However,
the court also noted a well-known exception to Eleventh Amendment restrictions,
under the early twentieth century case of Ex Parte Young.2'6 Under the rule of that
case, a party at risk of suffering a violation of federally protected rights may seek to
enjoin the offending state officers under some circumstances." 7 To take advantage
of the exception under Ex Parte Young, intervening case law has required that two
criteria be satisfied. First, the plaintiff must show that it seeks a remedy for a
continuing violation of federal law. Second, the plaintiff must show that the relief
requested is prospective."' The Virginia District Court determined that the
circumstances in Breard did not satisfy the first of these two criteria. The court
stated that Paraguay had not alleged that the Virginia authorities were, at that time,
impairing Paraguay's access to Breard.219  Indeed, the court emphasized that
Paraguay had helped Breard with his individual habeas action in the very same
court. 0
Of course, all this was after the state authorities had initially failed to inform
him of his Article 36 rights in a timely manner. But that failure was not a
continuing violation for Eleventh Amendment purposes. The District Court stated
that it was "disenchanted" with Virginia's failure to abide by the VCCR, and
indicated that the results of Virginia's failure might have led to tragic consequences
for Breard.Y' However, the court emphasized that this result was "still a
consequence of the violation and not a continuing wrong."'222 Allowing Paraguay
its requested relief in such circumstances would have accorded it "retroactive
213. Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1274 ("The parties agree that the [VCCR is] 'self-executing' under
th[e] definition" relating to "a treaty that does not require implementing legislation before becoming
federal law.").
214. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
215. Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1272. By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment only denies federal
courts jurisdiction over actions against a state by "Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." However, under Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), the
Supreme Court expanded state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to also apply to suits by
foreign sovereign states. See Id.
216. ExParte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1908).
217. Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1272.
218. Id. at 1272 (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1986)).
219. Id. ("There is no allegation that defendants refuse to allow plaintiffs to give Mr. Breard legal
assistance.").
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1273.
222. Id.
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relief, 223 which is precisely what the Ex Parte Young exceptions, as progressively
interpreted, preclude.
A panel of the Fourth Circuit, on appeal, 24 affirmed the District Court's
Eleventh Amendment analysis.225 The Fourth Circuit emphasized that a particular
Supreme Court precedent urged by Paraguay, Milliken v. Bradley,226 was
unavailing. In that 1977 case, federal injunctive relief was allowed for "ongoing
consequences of past violations. '27  The Fourth Circuit panel in the Paraguay
litigation, however, emphasized that in the Milliken case, the violation involved a
federal school desegregation order issued against state officials who "were in
violation of federal law at the precise moment when the case was filed."2"
The Supreme Court reviewed both the appeal of Breard's individual habeas
action and the appeal of Paraguay's action on petitions for certiorari. 29 The Court
denied both petitions.23 As discussed earlier, the Court denied Breard's individual
habeas petition due to procedural default. Like the Fourth Circuit panel, the
Supreme Court viewed the Eleventh Amendment as a dispositive bar to the grant of
Paraguay's requested relief.3 The Court acknowledged Paraguay's assertion that
the Breard facts were "within an exemption dealing with continuing consequences
of past violations of federal rights," '232 but dismissed this argument, concluding that
the "failure to notify the Paraguayan consul occurred long ago and has no
continuing effect.
'233
Accordingly, even though an injunction pursued by the detainee's sovereign
sending State might avoid the question of whether individuals can assert Article 36
rights in US courts, when such an injunction was sought in a thoroughly litigated
criminal case that went all the way to the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment
blocked its use. In that situation, the sending State sought an injunction for a
criminal case that had already been taken through final state appeal, when consular
assistance was no longer being precluded. It is foreseeable that in most such
scenarios, the sending State consul would also, at some post-conviction phase of
the proceedings, become involved. Any similar future request by a sending State
223. Id.
224. Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998) ("We agree ... that the violation alleged
here is not an ongoing one [and] that the essential relief sought is not prospective.").
225. The District Court also found lack of subject matter jurisdiction because "[w]ith the
exception of federal habeas review, district courts do not have jurisdiction to review final decisions of a
state court." Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1273. However, the Fourth Circuit panel explicitly declined to
address this issue. Allen, 134 F.3d at 626, n.4
226. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
227. Allen, 134 F.3d at 628 (citing Milliken, 433 U.S. 267).
228. Id.
229. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 374 (1998).
230. Id. at 378-79.
231. Id. at 377-78 ("The Eleventh Amendment provides a separate reason why Paraguay's suit
might not succeed.").
232. Id.
233. Id. The Supreme Court also added that "neither the text nor the history of the [VCCR]
clearly provides a foreign nation a private right of action in United States' [sic] courts to set aside a
criminal conviction and sentence for violation of consular notification provisions." Id.
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for an injunction on behalf of a detainee would encounter yet another obstacle, an
Eleventh Amendment Dead End in the Medellin Maze.
H. Escape from the Maze: A Sending State Article 36 Prospective Injunction
This article suggests a potential escape route from the Medellin Maze. The
point of this suggestion is not to persuade actors and observers who are hostile to
the interests of criminal detainees caught in the Maze that they should behave in
new ways regarding these detainees. Rather, the purpose of this proposal is to offer
a means of escape from the Maze that might be deployed by more sympathetic
actors and observers, while still maintaining doctrinal consistency with the
elements of the Maze that are already in place.
This article suggests that a sovereign state whose national has been detained by
American authorities in violation of the detainee's Article 36 rights should be able
to secure an injunction from a US court of applicable jurisdiction. Such an
injunction (an "Article 36 Injunction") would be granted to the foreign state itself,
and would apply prospectively to any of its nationals held by the authorities in that
US jurisdiction. The injunction would advance the interests of the sovereign state
under the VCCR, rather than the interests of the initial detainee. Indeed, the
injunction would not be directed to the initial detainee at all, because any relief
granted to the initial detainee would be retrospective. But after that first unlawful
detention, the foreign sovereign's interests under the VCCR would be so impaired
that the VCCR violation would be continuous and ongoing from the moment of its
commencement. Accordingly, a prospective Article 36 Injunction should be
granted at the request of any foreign sovereign sending State to secure future
compliance by the US authorities regarding future detainees.
The Supreme Court's position that state procedural default rules survive direct
challenge from the ICJ, and probably other international tribunals, is unlikely to be
weakened. Accordingly, detainees who have asserted tardy Article 36 claims-
even those on death row-may be tragically unable to escape the Medellin Maze.
Those detainees who complain in a timely manner about Article 36 violations may
also be caught at a Dead End, to the extent that Article 36 does not provide rights
that can be judicially enforced by individuals. Direct enforcement by international
tribunals leads to yet another Dead End, as does direct enforcement by the
Executive Branch. Even a federal statute directly requiring Article 36 compliance
may encounter a Dead End because of the judicial program of New Federalism.
Finally, the Eleventh Amendment Dead End will often bar a foreign state from
obtaining an injunction on behalf of previously detained individuals. An Article 36
Injunction, of the type herein suggested, avoids all of these pitfalls.
Ill. THE CONSULAR RELATIONSHIP AND THE VCCR
The purpose of the VCCR is to set up a permanent, ongoing relationship
between sending and receiving States through the consular posts established by
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each sending State in each receiving State. Substantial non-compliance with an
important provision of the VCCR compromises and impairs that relationship.
Whenever a particular party fails to comply with the VCCR, the effects of that non-
compliance reduce the degree of trust experienced by the other party. This
increases the probability that the other party will, in turn, fail to comply with one of
its obligations in the future. At very least, the quality of the mutual consular
relationship will be adversely affected by the initial non-compliance, and further
consular relations of various types will be affected.
The treaty is, of course, immediately violated upon any specific incident of
non-compliance. Additionally, any material violation of the VCCR triggers a
situation of continuing and ongoing non-compliance because the violation
substantially impairs the permanent relationship between states, which is the sole
reason for the treaty's existence. In the context of Article 36 of the VCCR, this
period of continuous and ongoing non-compliance survives as a matter of the total
relationship between the treaty parties. Accordingly, the continuing and ongoing
non-compliance persists, even if a particular sending State begins consulting with
any one of its nationals detained in any particular receiving State. The
consultations may address the needs of an individual detainee, but they do not
ameliorate the impairment of the consular relationship.
A. The Need for Constant Cooperation and Consent
The use of the word "Relations" in the title the "Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations" connotes the significance of the ongoing, continuous
relationships that are being established. The Convention is focused on maintenance
of the ongoing consular relationship, irrespective of (i) whether there are any
diplomatic relations,"" (ii) whether the premises are owned, leased or inhabited by
other means,23 or (iii) who the consular officials are at any given time.236
1. Consular Activities
Throughout the Convention there are numerous bases on which mutual consent
is explicitly required between the sending and receiving States. These connections
make possible the day-to-day activities of consular officials and employees.
Mutual consent to various actions must be reached on a regular basis throughout
the conduct of consular relations. Mutual consent is, of course, required for the
establishment of consular relations.237 As an initial matter, the receiving State must
consent to the location of the seat of the consular post, its classification (career or
234. VCCR, supra note 2, art. 2(3).
235. Id. art. l(1)(j) (contemplating a variety of modes of habitation).
236. Id. art. 10 (contemplating changes in officials' identities).
237. Id. art. 2(1).
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honorary), and the limits of the consular district.23 Consent also must be given for
any changes to these arrangements.239
The receiving State's consent is required for a consular officer to exercise his
functions outside of his consular district.2" More generally, the receiving State has
virtually unfettered discretion in deciding whether to grant an exequatur to any
person appointed as the head of a consular post by the sending State. Any such
exequatur must be granted before the head of the consular post can exercise
consular functions.
24
1
Consent of the receiving State is required for the appointment of an acting
head of post if the appointee is not already a diplomatic agent or a consular
officer.242 A receiving State's consent is required if a consular officer is to perform
diplomatic acts in the absence of a diplomatic mission in the receiving State.
2 43
Consent of a receiving State is also required if the same person is to serve as a
consular officer for two or more states.2 "
The size of the consular staff of any sending State depends, within the limits
stated in the Convention, on the agreement of the receiving State." The receiving
State has absolute discretion over whether a sending State may appoint consular
officers who are nationals of the receiving State,2" and the receiving State may also
reserve rights of consent for appointments of third state nationals.247 The capacity
of a receiving State to declare a consular officer persona non grata is within its
sole discretion, without any obligation to provide reasons.148 Upon severance of
consular relations, the sending State may entrust the consular premises and the
protection of its interests to a third state, but only if the third state is acceptable to
the receiving State.
24 9
2. Consular Functions
Article 5 of the VCCR consists of a long list of specific functions that consuls
are expected to perform. Most of these functions cannot be adequately performed
unless there is almost constant cooperation or consent from the receiving State.
In general terms, the consular function is to protect the interests of the sending
State and its nationals within the receiving State.2"' Article 5 describes certain other
consular functions in general terms. Such general functions include the
238. Id. art. 4(2).
239. Id. art. 4(3).
240. Id. art. 6.
241. Id. art. 12.
242. Id. art. 15(2).
243. Id. art. 17(1).
244. Id. art. 18.
245. Id. art. 20.
246. Id. art. 22(2).
247. Id. art. 22(3).
248. Id. art. 23(4).
249. Id. art. 27(i).
250. Id. art. 5(a).
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ascertainment "by all lawful means" of conditions and developments in the
commercial, economic, cultural and scientific life of the receiving State, and the
delivery of reports thereon to the government of the sending State.2"' Another
general function of Article 5 is the transmittal of judicial and other official
documents, commissions and letters to the courts of the sending State in any
"manner compatible with the laws and regulations of the receiving State. '5
Article 5 also is more precise in providing specific examples of particular
consular functions. For example, consular staff may be expected to safeguard the
interests of nationals in cases of succession mortis causa in the receiving State."'
Also, consular staff may be called upon to safeguard the interests of minors who
are nationals of the sending State.2" Consular staff may exercise rights of
supervision and inspection in respect of vessels having the nationality of, and
aircrafts registered in, the sending State.255 Consular staff members may also assist
such vessels and aircrafts, and their crews.2"
3. Power of Receiving States over Consular Activities and Functions
A receiving State can substantially impair any one of the activities and
functions of a sending State through a number of laws or official acts. Many such
laws and acts may well not violate the terms of the VCCR, so the execution of
consular activities and the fulfillment of consular functions depend on the
continued and constant cooperation of the receiving State. More particularly, the
ability of a sending State to fulfill its functions under the VCCR in another state
can depend on the compliance witnessed by the receiving State at its own posts in
the sending State. If a receiving State is not experiencing suitable treatment at one
of its consulates abroad, the relationships required for the functioning of the VCCR
will be jeopardized.
B. Mandatory Duties Under the VCCR
Many of the VCCR provisions outlined above allow one state (usually the
receiving State) to exercise discretionary consent in conducting consular relations.
The exercise of discretion, again by the receiving State, so as to deny consent to
any proposal from the sending State, does not generate a violation of the VCCR.
At the same time, the VCCR provides for many other aspects of consular relations
that are mandatory. Non-compliance with one of the mandatory provisions, such as
Article 36, would constitute a violation.
251. Id. art. 5(c).
252. Id. art. 50).
253. Id. art. 5(g). For example, transporting the body of a deceased national back to the sending
state, or treating it in a manner consistent with the wishes of family in the sending state.
254. Id. art. 5(h).
255. Id. art. 5(k).
256. Id. art. 5(l).
2010]
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
Obviously, if a particular receiving State were to engage in a pattern or
practice of violating one or more provisions of the VCCR with respect to a
particular sending State, that sending State could be justifiably angry or offended.
The sending State could be counted on to reciprocate through negative
discretionary determinations in its capacity as a receiving State. Most of the
obligatory requirements of the VCCR relate to consular privileges and immunities.
There are two types of such obligatory requirements: (i) those that relate to the
consular post itself, and (ii) those that relate to the officers and members of the
post.
1. Privileges and Immunities Relating to the Consular Post
Article 28 requires that receiving States accord "full facilities for the
performance of the functions of the consular post.""2 7  Mundane, yet crucial,
examples of privileges come to mind, such as access to public utilities and public
services (water, electricity, sewage, and police and fire protection). But most
critical to the continuous consular relationship are the essential dignitary and
practical privileges of consular relations. These are of utmost value to any sending
State, and their procurement and guarantee would necessarily be among the prime
reasons for any state to enter into the VCCR. Such privileges include the
inviolability of the consular premises,25 the consular archives and documents," and
official consular correspondence. 2" They also include the obligation of the
receiving State to ensure freedom of movement and travel to all members of the
consular post.26' Additional examples include the obligation of the receiving State
to "permit and protect freedom of communication on the part of the consular post
for all official purposes,"262 and the consular exemption from taxation of the
consular premises.263
2. Privileges and Immunities Relating to Consular Officers and Members of the
Post
Article 40 requires the receiving State to provide protection to consular
officers from "any attack on their person, freedom or dignity."'2" Consular officers
may not be held liable for arrest or pre-trial detention, nor may they be imprisoned,
except in the case of a grave crime.265 The VCCR goes on to specify that, "[i]f
257. Id. art. 28.
258. Id. art. 31.
259. Id. art. 33.
260. Id. art. 35(2).
261. Id. art. 34.
262. Id. art. 35(1).
263. Id. art. 32.
264. Id. art. 40.
265. Id. art. 41(l)-(2). This differs from the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
("VCDR"), which states that "a diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of
the receiving State." VCDR, supra note 41, art. 31 (1).
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criminal proceedings are instituted against a consular officer, he must appear before
the competent authorities." However, Article 40 then restricts the authorities'
discretion over the treatment of the officer.2" This is one of the few obligations on
the part of sending State personnel in the VCCR.
Members of a consular post can generally be asked to give evidence, but if
they refuse to do so, no coercive measure or penalty may be applied.67 Consular
officers and employees are generally immune from the jurisdiction of judicial or
administrative authorities in respect to those acts performed in the exercise of their
consular functions. 68 They are not immune, however, from civil actions arising out
of contracts concluded in a personal capacity, or from civil actions by third parties
for damages arising from an accident in the receiving State caused by a vehicle,
vessel or aircraft. 69  There are additional consular immunities regarding
requirements for the registration of aliens, the procurement of work permits, and
the satisfaction of social security obligations. 7
C. Uniqueness of the VCCR and VCDR
Every treaty entered into between or among states could be said to involve a
relationship. Along these lines, one might suggest that there is nothing unusual or
special about the relationships created by the VCCR. It is certainly true that most
every treaty involves relationships and those relationships are of a very high value.
But to simply assert the truth of that statement is to miss the point being made here.
For most multilateral treaties, the primary focus and purpose of the treaty are the
policy concerns that form the subject matter of the treaty, while the creation and
maintenance of relationships is secondary. For example, the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea27' has as its primary focus "the desire to settle, in a spirit of mutual
understanding and cooperation, all issues relating to the law of the sea";2" the
ICCPR7 3 is designed to protect political and civil rights; and the Rome Statute for
the International Criminal Court sets forth the beginnings of a regime for
permanent and wide-ranging international criminal law enforcement.274 These
multilateral treaties may create relationships among State Parties, but these
relationships are not the reason for existence of the treaty; policy-based strategies
for protecting the sea and civil rights are their reasons for being. Even the
266. VCCR, supra note 2, art. 41(3).
267. Id. art. 44(1). This also differs from the VCDR, which provides that "[a] diplomatic agent is
not obliged to give evidence as a witness." VCDR, supra note 41, art. 31(2).
268. VCCR, supra note 2, art. 43(1).
269. Id. art. 43(2). The exceptions to immunity from jurisdiction for diplomats under the VCDR
are more limited, relating to real property actions, succession in decedents' estates, or professional or
commercial activity outside official duties. VCDR supra note 41, art. 31.
270. VCCR, supra note 2, arts. 46-48.
271. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
272. Id.
273. Dec. 19, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
274. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter
Rome Statute].
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foundational UN Charter, although it certainly produces very valuable and critical
relationships, is primarily concerned with setting up the modem structure of
international governance, rather than with the maintenance of those relationships,
per se.
The VCCR and the VCDR are treaties of a fundamentally different sort.
These two treaties have no policy-based reason for existing. Their only real
purpose is the creation and maintenance of the relationships they govern. 75 These
are the only two multilateral treaties in which this is the case. For every other
multilateral treaty, the relationship is incidental to the purpose of the treaty; it is not
the purpose itself Similarly, bilateral treaties create relationships, but they are also
founded on policy-based concerns. For example, the reason for extradition treaties
is to assist in the execution of criminal justice in the signatory countries, and the
reason for border demarcation treaties is to quiet sovereign title disputes between
countries. As with multilateral treaties, the maintenance of relationships is
incidental to the purpose of the treaty.
IV. CONSULAR RELATIONS AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Obtaining an Article 36 Injunction is one way out of the Medellin Maze for a
sovereign sending State concerned about future VCCR compliance in the US.
However, injunctions against US state authorities can be difficult to obtain due to
the Eleventh Amendment. This is no less the case for injunctions sought by
sovereign states than it is for injunctions sought by private persons. Indeed, one of
the more recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting and enforcing the Eleventh
Amendment was the 1998 Breard decision, 7 6 regarding injunctive relief sought by
Paraguay against Virginia authorities.
But the limitations imposed by the Breard opinion should not restrict the
availability of an Article 36 Injunction. The injunction that Paraguay sought in
Breard would have protected Breard himself, as a particular criminal defendant
whose conviction in state court was already final. An Article 36 Injunction, as
proposed in this article, would be directed not to any particular defendant, but
rather to continuous and ongoing future compliance with the VCCR regarding
other detainees. Accordingly, neither Breard specifically, nor the Eleventh
Amendment in general, is a bar to obtaining an Article 36 Injunction as herein
proposed.
275. See also McGuinness, supra note 17, at 244 ("The consular protection function is central to
smooth functioning of the international system.").
276. See generally Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). See supra Part lI.G.
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A. The Breard Decision and the Eleventh Amendment
The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Breard takes the form of a per
curiam denial of petitions for certiorari and habeas corpus. 7 It is only twelve
paragraphs long. The ninth paragraph of the opinion explains the Court's approach
to the Eleventh Amendment in the case. This paragraph is based on two main
assertions. The Court first explains that neither the text nor the history of the
Vienna Convention clearly "provides a foreign nation a private right of action in
U.S. courts to set aside a criminal conviction and sentence" for a VCCR
violation."8 This assertion was based on a concern for the finality of state
judgments and clearly evinces the Court's desire to respect the "criminal conviction
and sentence" of the Virginia state courts. The Court's point here is limited to
disfavoring Paraguay's specific wish to "set aside" this particular sentence and
conviction. The Court's assertion should not be read as having any effect on the
status of the VCCR as a self-executing treaty in general, because the assertion is
limited in its content to Paraguay's desire to "set aside a criminal conviction and
sentence."
The second assertion sets forth the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to
Paraguay's requested relief regarding its national, Breard. This holding is based on
the Eleventh Amendment itself, rooted in concerns for the finality of state court
judgments, rather than on any inherent limitations stemming from the text and
history of the VCCR. In this assertion, the Court describes the basic concerns
underlying the Eleventh Amendment and its principal effects, then observes that
Virginia's "failure to notify the Paraguayan Consul occurred long ago and has no
continuing effect." ' Accordingly, the impact of Paraguay's requested relief would
have been retrospective, and not within Eleventh Amendment exceptions allowing
for injunctions against "continuing consequences of past violations of federal
rights."2" The requested relief was thus barred under the Eleventh Amendment.
Consequently, both assertions in the ninth paragraph of Breard regarding the
Eleventh Amendment have application only with respect to actions against US
states regarding detainees whose rights have already been violated under the
VCCR, and in many cases whose convictions are already final. The two assertions
deal with retrospective relief, not relief against violations that are continuous and
ongoing. The Eleventh Amendment analysis in Breard thus has no necessary
application to an Article 36 Injunction, which would enjoin a state's compliance in
the future.
277. These are the two principal petitions that the Court denies in Breard. The Court also denies a
motion for leave to file a bill of complaint and stay applications filed by Breard and Paraguay. Id. at
378-79.
278. Breard, 523 U.S. at 377.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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B. The VCCR as a Self-Executing Treaty
Because the Supreme Court has not resolved the question, it is still technically
uncertain whether the VCCR is a self-executing treaty. However, at this point, the
view most supported by authority is that the VCCR is self-executing. As such,
there would be no general impediment to its enforcement in US courts by other
parties to the treaty. Since 2005, at least three circuits have found the VCCR to be
self-executing.28' As noted above, some US courts have held that the VCCR is not
directly enforceable in US courts by private individuals; but that does not reflect on
its character as a self-executing treaty.
Status as a self-executing treaty is a separate matter from status as a treaty that
allows individual judicial enforcement. 282 The major problem in this area of the law
is that courts and commentators do not always adequately distinguish between
these two distinct concepts. But distinct they are, and the Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (the "Restatement") makes this
point explicitly. According to the Restatement, a treaty is self-executing if courts
are bound to give effect to it immediately upon its coming into force, without the
implementation of any domestic legislation.283 If a treaty is non-self-executing, US
courts will not give it effect in the absence of legislative implementation."
On the other hand, as a separate point altogether, the Restatement cautions that
the traditional understanding is that treaties generally do not create private rights or
provide for a private cause of action in US courts.2 5 This general understanding
applies whether a treaty is self-executing or non-self-executing. Thus, a treaty can
be self-executing, but not enforceable by individuals in US courts. In turn, finding
that a treaty is not individually judicially enforceable does not preclude a finding
that the treaty is self-executing. Some authorities, in blurring the distinction
between self-executing status and individual judicial enforceability, lose sight of
the possibility that neither self-executing status, nor a lack thereof, is conclusive on
the subject of individual judicial enforceability.
The Supreme Court confirms this view in its Medellin majority opinion. In
footnote four of its opinion, the Court reiterates the Restatement's provision, stating
281. Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 378 (7th Cir. 2005), withdrawn; Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822,
830 (7th Cir. 2007); Comejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2007); Gandara v.
Bennett, 538 F.3d 823, 828 (11 th Cir. 2008).
282. There is, of course, room for disagreement as to precisely what the phrase "self-executing
treaty" means. See David Sloss, Ex Parte Young and Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty
Violations, 75 WASH. L. REv. 1103, 1120 n.74 (2000) (declaring that "[t]he term 'non self-executing'
has multiple meanings," and collecting supporting references). However, as noted in the text above, the
Supreme Court relied on the Restatement in its majority Medellin opinion for the conventional
interpretation adopted in this article.
283. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(3)
(1987) ("Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to international law and to international
agreements of the United States, except that a 'non-self-executing' agreement will not be given effect as
law in the absence of necessary implementation.").
284. Id.
285. "International agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not
create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts .... Id. § 907 cmt. a.
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that treaties generally do not create private rights, "[e]ven when treaties are self-
executing in the sense that they create federal law." '286 Admittedly, the Court's
discussion of self-executing status in Medellin has been described as suggesting
confusion on the part of the Court.87 But this affirmation of the Restatement's
distinction between self-executing status and individual judicial enforceability is
clear enough.
Much scholarly debate has recently focused on how to determine whether a
treaty is self-executing or non-self-executing. It has been asserted that the Medellin
opinion creates a rebuttable presumption against self-executing status,288 while
some commentators have urged that, in fact, there should be a presumption in favor
of self-executing status. 89 The traditional view, as exemplified by the Restatement,
has been that the intention of the US in entering into a treaty generally determines
whether it is to be self-executing.'" Special importance is given to any statements
by the President in concluding the treaty, or by the Senate in ratifying it."'
The Supreme Court itself has explicitly declined to decide whether the VCCR
is self-executing, while some federal courts have expressed the view that the
VCCR is self-executing. As noted above, in the last five years, at least three
majority circuit rulings have expressly held that the VCCR is self-executing.
Furthermore, the District Court in Paraguay's action in the Breard case noted that
both "parties agree that the [VCCR is] 'self-executing,"' and in so doing the
District Court referenced the definition of "self-executing treaty," as being "a treaty
that does not require implementing legislation before becoming federal law.
292
The same year, a concurring opinion in the Fourth Circuit decision for Breard's
286. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008).
287. See, e.g., John T. Parry, A Primer on Treaties and §1983 After Medellin v. Texas, 13 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 35, 62 n.134 (2009) ("The Court's discussion of what it means for a treaty to be self-
executing exhibits confusion.").
288. "Medellin tightens the test for finding a treaty self-executing." Id. at 60 (stating that the
Court "comes close to creating a presumption that treaties have a status similar to legislation only if the
proponent of that view can prove that the language of the treaty supports such an interpretation."); Id. at
60 (referencing "the Court's apparent default position [after Medellin] that treaties are not self-
executing").
289. Jordan J. Paust, Medellin, Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant Executive
Authority, 31 SUFFOLK TRASNAT'L L. REv. 301, 329 (2008) ("There is a presumption that all treaties are
self-executing unless a contrary intent of the creators is manifest in the terms of the treaty... if a treaty
expressly or impliedly confers rights on individuals, it is self-executing."); Carlos Manuel Vizquez,
Treaties as Law of the Land The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122
HARv. L. REv. 600, 602 (2008) ("[T]he Supremacy clause is best read to create a presumption that
treaties are self-executing.").
290. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 11
cmt. h (1987) ("[T]he intention of the United States determines whether an agreement is to be self-
executing in the United States or should await implementation by legislation."). Cf Paust, supra note
289, at 329 ("The test involves attention to the text of a treaty in light of the treaty's context and object
and purpose and can include inquiry with respect to the probable intent (express or implied) of its
creators as well as in light of other international law.").
291. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111
cmt. h (1987) ("If the international agreement is silent as to its self-executing character and the intention
of the United States is unclear, account must be taken of any statement by the President in concluding
the agreement .... and of any expression by the Senate... in dealing with the agreement.").
292. Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Va. 1996).
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individual appeal of his conviction also determined that the VCCR was self-
executing.293 Admittedly, the exact language of this concurring opinion may be an
example of confusion between self-executing status and individual enforceability.
However, even if it is read as such, whenever there is no federal legislation
purporting to implement a treaty, a finding of individual enforceability necessarily
establishes self-executing status.
Also, the US State Department declared, in a report delivered to the Senate
during the ratification process for the VCCR, that the VCCR was "entirely self-
executing."2" The State Department also stated in this report that, "[t]o the extent
that there are conflicts with Federal legislation or State laws the Vienna
Convention, after ratification, would govern." '295 Both of these quotations were
justifiably emphasized by Justice Stephen Breyer in his Medellin dissent.296 In view
of ratification representations by the State Department, and indications from lower
court opinions, along with the Supreme Court's decision to hold the question open,
the VCCR can and should be considered self-executing.
C. Eleventh Amendment Update
As many will recall, the text of the Eleventh Amendment, by its terms,
generally excludes from the jurisdiction of federal courts any legal action against a
state by a private plaintiff from outside that state.297 The Supreme Court has held
that foreign sovereign states are among the type of plaintiffs whose actions are
barred in federal court.29 This would seem to pose an initial stumbling block for a
foreign sovereign state seeking to enforce a treaty against a US state in federal
court.
However, Supreme Court interpretations have also established certain
exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar. The primary exception
293. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) ("The Vienna Convention is a self
executing treaty-it provides rights to individuals rather than merely setting out the obligations of
signatories. The text emphasizes that the right of consular notice and assistance is the citizen's.")
(internal citation omitted).
294. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 556 (2008) ("[The] Convention is considered entirely self-
executive and does not require any implementing or complementing legislation.") (quoting S. Exec.
Rep. No. 91-9 p. 5(1969)).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. The text of the Eleventh Amendment provides that, "[t]he Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CONST. amend. X1. See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrTUrIoNAL LAW 49 (7th ed.
2000) ("The Eleventh Amendment acts as a bar to federal jurisdiction over state governments, as such,
when they are sued by anyone other than the federal government or another state.") (quoting Tennessee
Dep. of Human Services v. U.S. Department of Education, 979 F.2d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1992)).
298. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934) ("As to suits brought by a
foreign State, we think that the States of the Union retain the same immunity that they enjoy with
respect to suits by individuals whether citizens of the United States or citizens or subjects of a foreign
State.").
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is based on the early twentieth century case of Ex Parte Young,299 in which the
Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment would not necessarily bar a
federal suit preventing a state officer from enforcing state law.9 ° In the years since
its issuance, the Ex Parte Young exception has grown into a complex doctrine. The
basic point of the later developments is that, under the exception as now
interpreted, "a private person may bring an equitable action to force state officers to
comply with federal law in the future." '' In recent years, the picture has become
more involved than that. For the purposes of this analysis, the current status of the
Ex Parte Young exception rests primarily on two Supreme Court opinions from the
last quarter of the twentieth century: Milliken v. Bradley ("Milliken 11")302 and
Papasan v. Allain.0 3
The Milliken v. Bradley litigation involved a dejure racially segregated school
system that operated in and around Detroit. Initially, in Milliken I, the Supreme
Court invalidated a lower court remedial order that would have imposed an "inter-
district" student reassignment scheme. Thereafter, in Milliken I, the Court
validated the District Court's second order, designed to remedy the effects of the
earlier de jure segregation. This second order went beyond mere student
reassignment within Detroit, also entailing four additional programs regarding
reading, in-service teacher training, testing, and counseling. The order also
required that the State of Michigan pay half the costs of these four additional
programs.
In Milliken 1, the Supreme Court sustained this payment obligation against an
Eleventh Amendment attack, even though it was monetary in nature. This was
notable because one of the major considerations used in interpreting certain
features of the Eleventh Amendment is the desire to "prevent federal courts from
issuing judgments that must be paid out of the state treasury.""3 5 In validating these
payments, the Court drew a distinction between payments for retrospective
compensation and payments to fund future compliance. The Court recognized that
"'the award of an accrued monetary liability . . .' which represent[s] 'retroactive
payments' 3 °" would indeed be invalidated under the Eleventh Amendment.
However, the Court in Milliken II indicated that the payments ordered were not
such retrospective payments, but rather "a necessary consequence of compliance in
299. Ex Pare Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
300. NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 297, at 52.
301. Id. at 53.
302. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
303. Papsan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
304. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
305. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 297, at 52. John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda
offer this statement as part of the explanation for why "[a]n entity that is merely the instrumentality of
state government shares its immunity, but an entity that is a politically independent unit enjoys no
Eleventh Amendment protection." Id. They later continue: "[fin determining whether an agency is
entitled to share in the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court should determine if the state is
obligated to pay any of the agency's indebtedness. If the state has no legal obligation to bear the debts
of the enterprise, then the Eleventh Amendment is not implicated." Id.
306. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-64
(1974)).
2010]
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INTZ LAW
the future with a substantive federal-question determination . "..."30" The Court
further described this distinction by asserting that the factual situation in Milliken II
fit squarely within the "prospective-compliance exception" developed in earlier
cases following Ex Parte Young."8 The Court then reiterated that this exception
"permits federal courts to enjoin state officials to conform their conduct to
requirements of federal law, notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the
state treasury."3" The Court went on to say:
These programs were not, and as a practical matter could not be, intended
to wipe the slate clean by one bold stroke, as could a retroactive award of
money [damages]. Rather, by the nature of the antecedent violation,
which [caused harm to the victims, the victims] will continue to
experience the [harmful] effects until such future time as the remedial
programs can help dissipate the continuing effects of past misconduct.31
The Papasan case concerned federal grants of land to the State of Louisiana
(the "State"), which were made for the purposes of building and maintaining public
schools in the northern part of the State. The State invested the land grants in the
development of railroads that were destroyed during the Civil War and never
rebuilt. In recompense, the State legislature started making regular payments to the
affected school districts as "interest" on the notional "corpus" representing the lost
lands. The petitioners considered this arrangement inadequate. In federal court,
they sought, among other things, to compel "the establishment by legislative
appropriation or otherwise of a fund in a suitable amount to be held in perpetual
trust for the benefit of plaintiffs."" I
The Papasan plaintiffs seem to have viewed their situation as analogous to that
in Milliken II, on the theory that they were experiencing continuing harm resulting
from past misconduct. But the Supreme Court majority disagreed:
We discern no substantive difference between a not-yet-extinguished
liability for a past breach of trust and the continuing obligation to meet
trust responsibilities asserted by the petitioners. In both cases, the trustee
is required, because of the past loss of the trust corpus, to use its own
resources to take the place of the corpus or the lost income from the
corpus. Even if the petitioners here were seeking only the payment of an
amount equal to the income from the lost corpus, such payment would be
merely a substitute for the return of the trust corpus itself. That is,
continuing payment of the income from the lost corpus is essentially
307. Id. (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974) (internal quotations omitted)).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 290.
311. Papsan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 275 (1986).
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equivalent in economic terms to a one-time restoration of the lost corpus
itself. 3 2
The Court's interpretation in this respect centered on the character of a stream
of payments that were made in restitution for deleterious acts undertaken in the past
by a state legislature. The Court, in essence, maintained that branding the
payments a "continuing obligation" did not make them any less of a liability for a
past breach. In the Court's view, the fact that the breach occurred in the past was
crucial, and the payments were thus viewed as retroactive.
In the wake of Supreme Court cases such as Milliken II and Papasan, it is
possible to discern a two-part test for determining when facts of the type they
involved allow for relief consistent with the Eleventh Amendment. The Fourth
Circuit panel in Paraguay v. Allen laid out this test succinctly: "[F]ederal courts
may exercise jurisdiction over claims against state officials by persons at risk of or
suffering from violations by those officials of federally protected rights, if (1) the
violation for which relief is sought is an ongoing one, and (2) the relief sought is
only prospective.""3 3
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court, after Milliken and Papasan, and as part of
its disposition of the Breard litigation, addressed Eleventh Amendment issues in
one paragraph of its short per curiam opinion in Breard. The Court's application
of the Eleventh Amendment precedents to the facts in Breard was so brief as to be
cursory. The Court merely cited Milliken II, and said that the Milliken precedent
did not apply to the Breard facts since "[t]he failure to notify the Paraguayan
Consul occurred long ago and has no continuing effect."3 4 The Court seems to
have meant that the violation of federal law was no longer continuing, as the Court
had viewed the asserted violation in Papasan as no longer continuing. The Court's
curt concluding observation on the issue was that, "[t]he causal link present in
Milliken [II] is absent in this suit," apparently meaning that the reason for the harm
in Breard was not continuously linked to then present facts." 5
In any event, the two-part formulation stated by the Fourth Circuit panel in
Paraguay v. Allen seems like the most accurate and succinct analytical test to use
in evaluating this type of claim under the Eleventh Amendment at the present time.
D. The Article 36 Injunction and the Eleventh Amendment
If any national of a sending State is detained in the US and is convicted
without Article 36 compliance, the failure to observe the VCCR results in an
abrogation of the treaty. The VCCR, as a self-executing treaty ratified according to
312. Id. at 281.
313. Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F3d 622, 627 (4th Cir. 1998).
314. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1998).
315. Id. at 378.
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constitutionally adequate procedures, is binding federal law.3"6 Accordingly, its
abrogation is a violation of federal law."7
As this article has shown, any noncompliance with Article 36 notice and
information requirements creates an ongoing and continuous breach of the consular
relationship defined in the VCCR. Because the sole focus and purpose of the
VCCR is the establishment and maintenance of that relationship, its ongoing and
continuous breach is, effectively, an ongoing and continuous breach of the treaty
itself.
This article has also suggested that a sending State whose national has been
denied Article 36 protection can sue for an injunction to secure prospective
compliance by state authorities in that state.3"8 With this Article 36 Injunction, a
federal court could order state authorities, in all future dealings with detainees who
are nationals of the sending State, to observe the Article 36 notice and information
requirements. The Injunction addresses the ongoing and continuous breach of the
VCCR, but would not apply to treatment of detainees that occurred in the past. It
relates to a concrete, palpable worsening of the consular relationship clearly caused
by the initial breach and conviction.
The violation caused by an initial detention and conviction of a national from
the sending State causes the ongoing and continuous breach of the VCCR, and that
breach causes harm to the sending State. That harm is like the continuous harm
experienced by the petitioners in Milliken II because the VCCR relationship
continues unabated after noncompliance, just as the harm from the establishment of
segregated schools continued unabated after their establishment. The Injunction
itself is also prospective in character, since it is directed solely at the cessation of
316. In the academic literature after Medellin, there has been some discussion regarding the extent
to which non-self-executing treaties can legitimately be considered the "Supreme Law of the Land."
E.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Internet, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT'L L.
540, 548 (2008) ("[The [Medellin majority] opinion leaves unclear.., whether a non-self-executing
treaty is simply judicially unenforceable, or whether it more broadly lacks the status of domestic law.").
There is much less cause for such misgivings, however, with respect to a self-executing treaty, such as
the VCCR. At the very least, self-executing treaties are judicially enforceable, and as such are readily
perceived to occupy the status as federal law.
317. It has generally been asserted that "the Supremacy Clause arguably creates an implied right
of action to enjoin enforcement of state laws that are preempted by treaties." Sloss, supra note 282, at
1152. This approach suggests that the Ex Parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment is broadly
applicable for all claims against US states for treaty violations. This is an intriguing approach, and this
article does not intend to detract from it. However, this article makes the more limited point that an
Article 36 violation, when made the subject of an Article 36 Injunction of the type herein suggested,
would normally satisfy the continuing violation and prospective relief requirements that have generally
applied even when the Ex Parte Young exemption is applicable. Those federal cases allowing the Ex
Parte Young exemption for treaty claims have still retained these requirements. E.g., Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 124 F.3d 904, 914 (8th Cir. 1997), affid on other grounds,
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (concluding that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar the residual treaty claims at issue because they sought "prospective injunctive
relief against state officials in their official capacities for continuing violations of the Bands' federal
treaty rights").
318. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Justiciability of Paraguay's Claim of Treaty Violation, 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 697, 700 (1998) ("There is no present reason why foreign states should not be able
voluntarily to submit their treaty claims for adjudication by U.S. courts.").
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an ongoing violation, rather than the individual circumstances of any person
already convicted."9
The Article 36 Injunction does not assist any person already convicted of an
Article 36 violation and, due to Eleventh Amendment considerations, it could not.
This feature does not, however, rob the Injunction of its utility. The sending State
for the foreign detainee is the real party in interest whenever Article 36 is violated.
The sending State is the counterparty of the US under the VCCR, whose consular
relationship has been abrogated as a result of noncompliance with the Article 36
requirements. Although the position of any detainee from any sending State
convicted without compliance with Article 36 is unfortunate, a large part of the
harm caused by such noncompliance relates to the prospects of future detainees.
The Article 36 Injunction directly addresses this harm.
The US, both through its President and its Supreme Court, has recognized that
noncompliance with the Article 36 notice and information requirements violates an
international treaty obligation. Given that the President and the Supreme Court
have both openly declared that a failure to adhere to Article 36 requirements results
in a breach of international law, it is especially appropriate to provide for
meaningful Article 36 relief.
CONCLUSION
Constitutional doctrines, lower court opinions, and Supreme Court opinions,
most recently the Supreme Court opinion in Medellin v. Texas, have greatly
impaired the enforceability of VCCR Article 36 in the US. They have created a
confusing and nearly impenetrable maze for any party in the US seeking to enforce
Article 36 protections: the Medellin Maze.
Prisoners who have been convicted after state authorities have not complied
with Article 36 have been precluded from complaining about the violations because
of state procedural default rules. The Supreme Court has upheld such state
procedural rules against attack by international tribunals. Lower courts have
maintained that, even if a detainee were to complain in a timely fashion, thus
avoiding procedural default, Article 36 does not allow individuals to obtain judicial
relief in US courts. The Supreme Court clearly believes that judgments by
multilateral international tribunals cannot be imposed upon US courts to secure
Article 36 compliance. Existing separation of powers doctrine prevents the
Executive Branch from directly ordering such compliance in US courts, and may
well also prevent Congress from requiring compliance at the state level.
Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment prevents individuals from seeking
injunctions against criminal proceedings in violation of Article 36. The Medellin
Maze is intricate and seemingly impregnable. This intricacy and apparent
impregnability does a serious disservice to the US in the current international legal
319. Cf Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (invalidating a lower court order for payment of
past due assistance checks, but upholding the order to the extent that it required disbursement of
payments prospectively due).
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environment. It is now especially important, in the international arena and at home,
for the US to stand for the rule of law. The three opinions of the Supreme Court in
recent years addressing Article 36 have consistently resulted in a failure of its
enforcement in the US. The Medellin Maze poses a significant problem with
respect to the current relationship between the US and international law.
This article has acknowledged that the enforcement of Article 36 in US courts
will involve serious domestic legal and constitutional issues. It is indeed legitimate
to take these issues-involving separation of powers, federalism, and the character
of a common law adversarial legal system-into account. Accordingly, this article
has offered an "escape route" from the Medellin Maze that is narrowly crafted and
has a specifically defined scope. The Article 36 Injunction proposed herein would
enforce Article 36 notice and information requirements for a sending State's future
detainees, once authorities in a US state have convicted a national of that sending
State in violation of Article 36. Such an injunction would meaningfully address the
interests of the sending State that have been impaired by the Article 36 violation,
while still observing the strictures imposed by concerns for separation of powers,
federalism, the character of the common law adversary system of justice, and the
finality ofjudgments.
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